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CONTENTS

Editor's Notes 83

Administrators: a Neglected Factor in Pastoral Development in East Africa 84
Robert Chambers

The Administration of Public Enterprises in Malaysia 95
G Shabbir Cheema

Co-operatives and the Poor 107
Peter Yeo

Volcano in Tonga 116
James Lewis

Policy Articulation of Local Autonomy in Filipino Municipal Reform, 1946-1960 123
A B Villanueva

Quarterly Notes 135

Book Reviews 138
by *Professor O H Koenigsberger, A R G Prosser, J T Winpenny, Michael Safier, R H Belcher, Hubert Allen, Barrie Macdonald, T C Colchester* and *Chris Scott*

Book Notes 153

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Attention is drawn to a Printer's error which occurred in the Index included with our last issue (Vol XVIII — No 1). The Index related, of course, to *Volume XVII Nos 1-4 1978* and not to Volume XVIII for 1979.

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Editor's Notes

In this Number we include articles on East Africa, Malaysia, Tonga and the Philippines, together with a short study of one facet of Co-operatives in the Third World.

Robert Chambers writing with wide experience of Africa, provides some refreshing and stimulating thinking about the administrative aspects of pastoral development in East Africa. He argues convincingly that the prospects for pastoralists, themselves a minority group in their own countries, will remain bleak unless and until the administrators of pastoral areas (who invariably come from a non-pastoral background), become the subject for: research by *national* social scientists; for management consultancy; and for training – the latter principally to help them to overcome their all-too-common misconceptions about pastoralism.

Shabbir Cheema examines the growth of public enterprises in Malaysia which he sees as fulfilling the vital role in the national economy of eliminating inter-ethnic disparities of income.

Peter Yeo seeks to discover how best Co-operatives in the Third World can help to better the lot of the poor. He offers some sensible guidelines while emphasising that there are very real limitations on the extent to which co-operatives can assist, and he rightly points out that too much has often been expected of them as a panacea for the problems of the poor peasantry.

It is only recently that national governments and international agencies have got down seriously to pre-disaster planning. They had not done so in 1946 when a major volcanic eruption occurred on Niufo'ou in the most northerly group of the Friendly Islands of Tonga. It is relevant, besides providing a fascinating story, that James Lewis had the opportunity which he fortunately seized, while following up the 1977 volcanic eruption on 'Eua (a large island close to the main Tongan island of Tongatapu), to record an account of the 1946 disaster told to him by a local resident who had maintained a diary at the time.

Finally, Professor Villaneuva examines in some depth why, despite high-level declarations of intent, no serious decentralisation has yet taken place from the central government of the Philippines to any Municipal Councils. He points out the sad fact that the existence of the Welfare or 'Warfare' State dictates all too often the transfer of greater powers to the centre at the expense of local units.

Administrators: a Neglected Factor in Pastoral Development in East Africa*

ROBERT CHAMBERS**

Pastoral development in East Africa has been beset with many problems. Analysis of these problems has tended to concentrate on ecological, social, economic, political and rather general administrative aspects. The theme of this article is that, in addition, administrators themselves are an important but neglected factor; that they must be studied and understood as part of the system when trying to find solutions to problems of pastoral development; and that to realise the potential of administrators more fully requires a combination of research, consultancy, and training.

'Administrators' here means field government staff who work in pastoral areas. They may be at regional, provincial, district or sub-district levels. The term includes generalist administrators, and veterinary, animal husbandry, game, forestry, and other departmental staff. Typically they do not originate from the pastoral area in which they are working. 'Pastoral development' means change in pastoral areas which variously combines and reconciles (a) sustainable productivity, (b) considerations of equity, and (c) what pastoralists want.

The Neglect of Administrators

Almost any conceivable form of pastoral development, and certainly all those contemplated in East Africa, requires administrative action. Many of the components of any project or programme will rely upon it: whether surveys, planning, physical works, consultation with pastoralists, disease control, grazing rotation, stock limitation, marketing, or the provision of social services. Administrative action has many aspects, including organisation, management and politics, but here attention is focussed on the administrators themselves. They powerfully influence the nature of the official interventions which so frequently fail or lead to unintended results; and it is they who implement or fail to implement programmes or policies. When things go wrong, administrators blame pastoralists for being ignorant and stupid; and social scientists hasten to explain how the behaviour of pastoralists is rational, an able adaption to a

*This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Workshop on East African Pastoralism organised by the International Livestock Centre for Africa and held in Nairobi on the 22-26 August 1977. The papers of the Workshop are in the process of publication by ILCA, PO Box 5689, Addis Ababa.

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hostile environment. Social scientists then transfer the blame, in private conversation if not in public discussion or writing, to the administrators themselves, finding their behaviour ignorant and stupid in turn. That the behaviour of the administrators may be rational, an able adaptation to a different sort of hostile environment, may not be investigated. To the extent that this is so, one may ask whether it is not the social scientists themselves who are at fault.

For administrators are also human and a significant part of the development system; and for the future, any effective systems approach to the planning, implementation or monitoring of pastoral development must surely include them as a key factor.

It is, then, striking that there is little comparative knowledge about administrators in pastoral areas. Although administrators must be considered part of the human ecology of pastoralism, it is understandable that natural scientists should neglect them; and none of the 30 chapters in Pratt and Gwynne's *Rangeland Management and Ecology in East Africa* concerns itself with them. What is more surprising is that social scientists have paid them so little attention[1]. It has been very much the exception, not the rule, to include them in social science studies. Conrad Reining in his work on the Zande Scheme felt he was breaking new ground as a social anthropologist in the extent to which he was forced to take account of the influence of administrators, writing that

> This study is unique in the degree to which it attempts to specify the influence of non-Africans in the modern African scene. I do not undertake to study British culture as such, but merely to account for changes in Zande society that have originated with the British administrators . . . since some important changes have arisen almost entirely from the culture of the European administrators, with little modification from Zande culture, the administrators had to be included in the society under study. (1966:xvi)

But usually those outsiders, mainly social anthropologists, who have been closest to pastoralists and understood them best, have not been inclined to include administrators in their studies, have treated them as an exogenous variable, and have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on the pastoralists themselves.

Several explanations can be advanced for this neglect of administrators by social anthropologists. In the first place, there is a personal and diplomatic dimension. Social anthropologists work in particular areas or districts. Anything they write about administrators is liable to be linked with particular individuals. (Reining's extraordinary frankness about 'the second District Commissioner' may have been permitted only by the end of the colonial regime and the lapse of a decade between his fieldwork and his book.) A frank and detailed analysis might be rash

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[1]But see Baker 1974: 3-10 for administrators' and planners' perceptions; Monod on 'Le Nomade et le Commissaire' in Monod, ed, 1975: 55-60; Spencer 1973: 168-198 for a chapter on 'The Samburu and Rendille under British Administration'; and Welch 1969 *passim*. To this author's knowledge, however, and with the partial exception of Welch's work, no study has yet been made of the life, work and problems of administrators in pastoral environments.

and even subject to litigation. Moreover, to the extent that social anthropologists depend on the goodwill of administrators, they will not wish to offend them either individually or collectively, and their reluctance to criticise may be stronger to the extent that they develop friendships with them. A second explanation may be quite simply that fieldwork is exacting and generates so much information and so many questions that social anthropologists have neither time, energy nor inclination to expand their studies to include administrators. A third, and perhaps most persuasive explanation is that the administrative system is not part of the traditional concerns of ethnographic studies. It may be considered the legitimate study not of social anthropology but of public administration and political science.

But students of public administration and political science have also tended to ignore administrators in pastoral areas. There have been studies of rural administration (for example, in Hyden *et al.* 1970, and Leonard 1973) and many of agricultural extension. But only one, to my knowledge, deals specifically with administrators in a pastoral area, and this – Calvin Welch's thesis on pastoralists and administrators in Karamoja (1969) – is unpublished.

Again, reasons for this lack of research are not difficult to see. Pastoral areas are often remote and inaccessible. Administrators there are more difficult to study than administrators in settled agricultural areas. The great majority of students may anyway prefer to work in settled agricultural areas if these are the areas from which they originate and with which they feel familiar. Social scientists, especially students, tend prudently to study what is studiable and physically less exacting. In these circumstances, it is perhaps not to be wondered at that so little that is relevant has been written.

Given the factors which deter social scientists from studying and writing about administrators, there is a danger of repeatedly aiming research at lower priority targets. Professionals are tempted to cross the t's and dot the i's of existing paradigms and concerns while leaving expanses of ignorance untouched. Peter Rigby is by no means unusual in having called for more sociological research without specifying that it should be directly related to the political and planning problems which he identifies. In his paper on 'Pastoralism and Prejudice', he has written:

> If livestock development is to become a major tool in rural development, much more sociological research of an intensive kind would pay handsome dividends. I have suggested that there are, however, deep-seated political and planning problems involved. Some of these problems are a legacy we have inherited from the colonial regimes. But others stem from unformalised but persistent prejudice, particularly at local administrative and 'popular' levels against pastoral and semi-pastoral peoples. This suggests that the planning and administrative hierarchies are insufficiently coordinated to translate enlightened attitudes and policies on pastoral development into action at the local level. (n.d. 51)

This is, of course, only one paragraph from a long paper. But it does illustrate the tendency. Sociological research implies research on the pastoralists not on the administrators. But pastoralists in East Africa are relatively well understood by

social scientists. The main problem is to see how to make the insights of social scientists accessible to administrators and how, appropriately, to influence their attitudes and behaviour. For that, an understanding of administrators themselves is needed, and it is towards them that research should be directed.

As long as we remain largely ignorant of administrators and their environments, there are two dangers.

The first danger is the ease of thinking of them in terms of uncomplimentary stereotypes as ignorant, arrogant and arbitrary in their actions. It must be admitted that in both the colonial and the post-colonial periods, the actions and attitudes of administrators have quite often seemed to justify those epithets. Examples can be found in the long list of failures in pastoral management and of failures to learn from failures; in the recurrent reflex to compel pastoralists to settle and grow crops, regardless of whether this would be sound land use, whether crops would grow, or whether people would want to settle; in alternations between indifference and laissez-faire policies on the one hand, and resort to force and compulsion on the other; in the continuing practice of putting in more water without measures to sustain the productivity of the range made accessible by that water; in what sometimes appears a perverse refusal to grasp the rationality of nomadism. I have myself as an administrator been guilty of some of these errors and now, looking back, am staggered at my blindness and at a loss to understand how I could have been so deluded. The puzzle and the challenge here are to try to understand why administrators behave as they do; and why they believe what they believe. Administrators may indeed, in their ignorance, be prejudiced about pastoralists but so too may social scientists, in their ignorance, be prejudiced about administrators. The stereotypes of administrators may be built up and reinforced not by research but by anecdotes selected because they make good stories, quoting the quotable, as is done, be it noted, in this paper. There is, however, no *a priori* reason to suppose that administrators' behaviour is any less rational, given their environments, than is pastoralists', given theirs. Only when knowledge of that rationality replaces prejudice will it be possible to see how they, the administrators, can be influenced to behaviour differently.

The second danger is that we will continue to ignore the administrative factor in planning for pastoral development. John Howell, writing of the Western Sudan, has argued the need as part of the planning process for an 'administrative resource survey'. He asks:

> What institutions for implementation exist at local level? What is the 'carrying capacity' of the local administration? How far can the structure of central, provincial, district and local council administration enhance the prospects for detailed development planning? How are planning decisions taken? What is the existing strength of professional field staffs? It is only after answers to these questions have been attempted that the development plan itself can be appraised and an institutional strategy for implementation be considered. It is not enough to conjure up some ideas on implementation simply as an afterthought to the recommendations based on an integrated resource survey. The administrative 'mapping' must be part of the development plan itself.
> (1977:106)

An administrative resource survey in pastoral areas might frequently reveal systemic problems which would limit and condition what could be attempted; and in the absence of such a survey, proposals drawn up are likely to be unrealistic.

Factors Affecting Administrators

Ignorant though we are, scattered evidence and impressions can be drawn together to suggest four clusters of factors which especially affect the motivation, behaviour and perceptions of administrators; and these four also constitute a partial agenda for future research. They are:

i transfers and continuity;

ii difficult and unpopular postings;

iii administrative convenience;

iv encapsulation and belief systems.

i *transfers and continuity*

To the extent that pastoral development requires confidence and mutual understanding between pastoralists and administrators, continuity of contact will be an important element in success. Such continuity may be all the more important when the pastoralists distrust the administrators and the administrators misperceive or misunderstand the pastoralists. Of late colonial grazing schemes in Kenya, Richard Hennings wrote that if there was little prospect of staff continuity over, say, the first five years, it was probably better not to start at all; and that the surest key to success in the early stages at least was to have the right officer actually living in the area (1961:68). This is borne out by the experience in Kenya in the late 1950s and early 1960s: grazing schemes enjoyed apparent success in West Pokot District with the same officer in charge for the better part of a decade, but fared worse elsewhere where there were staff changes.

There was probably greater continuity in field posts during the late colonial period than there has been since. The period of de-Europeanization and Africanization was inevitably a time of very rapid transfers which have since moderated but probably stabilized at a higher rate of turnover than before. The evidence is scattered but consistent. For Southern Darfur Province in Sudan, John Howell reports 'a record of high staff turnover' (1977:177). For the Taita and Kaputiei Schemes in Kenya, Morag Simpson observes that 'a very heavy responsibility falls on the Range Management Division's local range officers. . . . They are . . . liable to be transferred from one part of Kenya to another and their period of service in any one location is often less than a year' (1973:15). At a District Development Committee meeting which I attended in 1970 in Samburu District in Kenya and which had before it as the major item on the agenda a land use plan for part of the district, only one of the ten or so government officers present had been in the District for more than a year. Indeed, Jon Moris, having worked for some years in a pastoral area of Tanzania, has suggested

that frequent transfers may now be systemic in East African administrations. He has put forward the view that they are linked with a lack of effective control systems for top officials who then use the transfer of subordinates as 'the main administrative solution to almost every problem' (1977:79). If this is so, then there may be only very temporary and superficial contact between what are often two systems of nomadism – that of the pastoralist and that of the administrator – with neither trying to invest in understanding the other but merely trying to capitalise on what both recognise as a transient relationship. Such a situation severely limits the types of initiatives which can be contemplated in pastoral development.

ii *difficult and unpopular postings*

In both colonial and post-colonial East Africa, administrators have usually come from cultural backgrounds alien to those of pastoralists themselves. The three main groups are expatriate colonial administrators; expatriate technical assistance personnel; and now most importantly, African administrators from a non-pastoral background.

Expatriate colonial administrators were, of the three groups, probably the most satisfied with their postings and the life it entailed. Most of these administrators in East Africa were people who had chosen to live and work away from their home country and who expected and were prepared for unfamiliar experiences. Those who worked in pastoral areas were partly self-selected because they preferred the sort of life entailed. Some like Charles Chenevix Trench (1964) revelled in the opportunity for a physically exacting, unconventional and hard life in remote areas. Many, perhaps most, of the colonial administrators who worked in pastoral districts did so in preference to work in settled agricultural districts.

With technical assistance personnel and volunteers the pattern is by no means so clear. Quite often, it seems, they have been unprepared or unsuitable. The evidence is scattered, incomplete and anecdotal, as with three USAID-funded technicians who had to be removed from Tanzanian Masailand and returned to the United States (Hess 1976:22). A strange and perhaps extreme example is presented by the American Peace Corps volunteers who worked in range management in Kenya, of whom Morag Simpson has written that this struck her as

> . . . the most bizarre feature of the whole operation. The Peace Corps consists of young men newly graduated, usually with neither ranching nor African experience. These unfortunate people were sent into the wilds of Taita and Kaputiei after a brief initiation course to camp under canvas in the locations where ranches are planned. They were supposed to organise the local people and then become the managers of the ranches when they started. One cannot but be sorry for them; camping in a strange environment, often sick from insect bites, food and water infections, surrounded by wild animals and snakes, with curious Africans watching them yet unable to communicate with these other human beings owing to their ignorance of the local languages. It is not surprising that some of these young men left, not being able to stand the conditions. It is remarkable that one or two made a success of their mission. (Simpson 1973:16)

In general, technical assistance personnel and volunteers probably experienced more severe shocks and found their postings and work more difficult than had expatriate colonial administrators who had a longer acclimatization and more clearly defined roles.

By far the most important group is African administrators who come from a non-pastoral background. (Partly because of relatively low educational standards among pastoral peoples, most administrators are probably not from pastoral but from settled agricultural backgrounds.) For them, it seems, postings to pastoral areas, epecially when these are remote, are usually unpopular. The reasons include:

— the use of such posts for penal purposes for those who have in some way misbehaved or fallen from favour, or for those who are politically weak and least able to resist. (This also occurred in the colonial period.);
— the distance from the capital where transfers and promotions are decided;
— difficulties with children's education and often the need to leave children in school elsewhere in the country, with consequent family disruption and cost;
— physical factors such as climate and diet;
— distaste for extensive travel and camping out;
— social isolation in what is perceived as an alien culture;
— lack of urban amenities;
— inadequate transport.

One consequence may be that administrators spend much of their time on activities unrelated to pastoral development. They may make frequent and prolonged visits on various pretexts to regional headquarters and to capital cities, both for social reasons and in order to campaign for a more congenial posting. A high proportion of their transport votes may go on these trips, curtailing their ability to travel locally. In the pastoral area itself they may devote much effort and imagination to improving their conditions. As Calvin Welch has pointed out in his description of the District Team in Karamoja in 1968, they may form a pressure group. His example may be extreme, but it does give the flavour of administrators' concerns in somewhat isolated posts. The District Team, he says, was 'wholly a creature of the local representatives of the various Ministries of the Central Government'. He goes on

> In March, the Team devoted a large portion of its meetings to 'allowances in relation to costs in Karamoja'. Topics under consideration at that time were the price of matoke, the poor quality of fresh milk, the high price of petrol in Moroto, the inadequacy of the 'up country' living allowance, the absence of 'price control' in the District with the resultant effect being (in the eyes of the Team) that 'the Civil Servant in Karamoja was the Victim' (capitalization in the original). . . . In October of 1968, a discussion was centred around a TV station for Moroto. The Team felt that 'in view of the fact that the number of TV owners in Moroto had increased tremendously' a TV station should be built in Moroto, or failing that, 'a TV repairman should visit Moroto as often as possible'.
> This over-concern with creature comforts of the Civil Service shown by the District Team, while being understandable, is nonetheless indicative of the Team's total unawareness of the major problems of the District. Indeed, . . . the Team was willing to close the only agricultural training establishment in the entire District if it meant by so doing that they could get fresh milk delivered in Moroto . . . (Welch 1969:218-9)

The importance of this example is not that it necessarily indicates a general condition, at least in such an extreme form, but that it does contribute to an agenda for research. If African administrators from non-pastoral backgrounds dislike their postings, this is liable to influence their attitudes and behaviour. Only by understanding their problems and motivations and the rationality of their behaviour given their environments will it be possible realistically to identify measures for improvement.

iii *administrative convenience*

Administrators' behaviour is partly determined by convenience. Their tasks, of course, vary by department and by district. There is, however, a recurrent tension between what is convenient to the administrator and what is convenient to the pastoralist. Administrators like fixed locations. They often concentrate their attention on site-bound activities – the building of schools, health centres, dams, boreholes, government offices, roads, crushes, and the like. These are conveniently static, and being physical, are visible and even photogenic and can be shown to visitors as evidence of progress. They are also, of course, often badly needed. But this preference for the physically fixed carries over into prescriptions for the human and animal population. The persistent view that pastoralists should be made to settle in one place may reflect not only a cultural preference for settled agriculture but also a desire for administrative convenience. Those who are settled are more easily regulated, taxed, protected, and even fed in times of famine. But those who settle in small centres may be atypical: the very rich, who can afford to abandon nomadism and the very poor who cannot afford to continue it. The great majority of the population may continue its nomadic way of life under pressure from the imperatives of a marginal environment, inconveniently out of touch for site-bound administrators. Convenience keeps administrators and pastoralists apart.

iv *encapsulation and belief systems*

Administrators who are alien to a pastoral environment may be especially vulnerable to encapsulation and to belief systems composed largely of myths. The encapsulation is both physical and cognitive. Physically, they may be almost entirely confined to their houses, offices and vehicles, with little or no direct exposure to the world of the pastoralists. Cognitively, they may seek out, be exposed to, and be presented with, highly selective information. In particular, all or almost all those with whom they come into contact will have special reasons for presenting slanted or selected information and impressions. Those government staff who originate from the local pastoral population are often caught in an awkward intercalary position, 'the nut in the nutcracker' (Welch 1969:200), between administrators on the one hand, and pastoralists on the other, and may try to sustain their position by presenting to the administrators information which provides 'evidence' for what the administrators want to believe. The administrators themselves may have what Dahl and Hjort call an 'anti-nomad ideology' (1976:18) supported by misconceptions about pastoralists. The outcome can be the coexistence of two belief systems about the same reality: that of the administrators; and that of the pastoralists themselves. This appears

to have been true in the colonial period as well as today. Thus of the earlier period, Paul Spencer found

> 'two sets of values with little in common (save mutual goodwill on both sides) and two worlds of reality coexisting in one district' (1973:174)

and of more recent situations, Randall Baker has similarly observed that

> there exist two separate worlds, those of the planner and the planned; divided by a gulf of perception. The failure to bridge this gulf is a major contributory factor to the deplorable state of Africa's rangeland at the present time as well as to the distressing *impasse* which exists between stock keeper and administrator, planner or visiting expert. (n.d. 360)

In making generalisations such as these there are also dangers. It has to be asked whether our perceptions are selective; whether we collect and remember anecdotes which show administrators in a poor light; whether failures receive more attention than successes; and whether pastoral development is not inherently so difficult that there is a persistent tendency to place the blame for shortcomings on administrators who are, in a situation of widespread ignorance even on the part of the 'experts', attempting what is virtually impossible. But administrators may be behaving rationally, and they need their belief systems just as, in their different ways, pastoralists are behaving rationally and need theirs; and administrators, like the pastoralists and pastoral situations with which they deal, are not all the same. Depressing though the general impression may be, particular cases may be more encouraging.

A Direction for Solutions

The solutions sought depend on the problems identified. The problems identified depend, in turn, upon the discipline and viewpoint of the observer. The multi-faceted nature of pastoral situations and pastoral development needs no emphasis. But what the tentative assertions above suggest is that, in the sphere of planning and implementation, something more may be needed than conventional prescriptions. It takes us some way to identify, as Randall Baker has done, that there is an administrative trap: that different departments handle different sectors, and that the social aims and norms of the pastoralists are neglected because no department is competent to deal with them (Baker 1975). But one has to ask who is to assess and represent within the planning bureaucracy those social aims and norms, and how it can be made possible and rational for them to do so. Those most suitable may well be those who claim the right: the generalist administrators who, in departmental debate, use as a trump card their opinions about what is politically feasible, and what the people will accept or can be persuaded to do. This, then, leads us back to the perceptions and behaviour of those generalist administrators, and the four adverse conditions of lack of continuity in post, of difficult and unpopular postings, of administrative convenience, and of encapsulation and misleading beliefs.

The most effective solution to these four problem areas may lie, as with much management development, in a combination of research, consultancy and training.

Research appears necessary in order more systematically and fully to understand the life, work, perceptions and beliefs of administrators; it is particularly needed because administrators who work with pastoralists appear to have been less studied and less understood than those who work in areas of settled agriculture, and because social scientists' views of such administrators, starting from the effects of their actions on pastoralists, have tended to be unsympathetic. For reasons which parallel those for the persistence of technical assistance and for the unpopularity among national administrators of work in pastoral areas, almost all the research on pastoral systems that has been written up has so far been by non-nationals, as reflected in the references to this paper. In addition to other powerful reasons for future research by nationals, the study of administrators may be an area where they have a strong comparative advantage over non-nationals in ease and accuracy of understanding and interpretation.

Consultancy appears necessary because some of the problems are systemic. If frequent transfers and unpopular postings are a serious and endemic problem, then management consultancy within or for the government concerned will be needed, together with progressive administrative changes, if the problems are to be reduced or overcome. Questions of selection and induction of suitable staff may emerge as critical.

Training appears necessary because of administrators' misperceptions of pastoralism and of pastoralists and because of the misprescriptions which flow from them. The assumption here is that better understanding on the part of administrators would improve their own actions and make pastoral development at least less unlikely.

These three approaches are mutually supporting. Together, they are greater than the sum of their parts. Any organisation undertaking them has to be versatile and credible. It may be that this would be difficult, in most countries, for any national organisation on its own. In Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, for example, predominantly pastoral districts are a minority and might not justify using national resources to mount a special programme. Perhaps the International Livestock Centre for Africa could develop such a capability for research and consultancy and conduct training partly through national institutes of administration or agricultural training organisations. The tasks are intimidating and the risks high. But if the argument of this paper is correct, many of the problems in pastoral development lie in the administrators themselves and in the administrative environment in which they operate; and unless these problems are understood and overcome, the prospects for pastoral development in much of East Africa may well remain poor.

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The Administration of Public Enterprises in Malaysia

G. SHABBIR CHEEMA*

There are many reasons for the establishment of public enterprises within the context of developing countries. These can be divided into three categories. One set of reasons is ideological. Even in some non-socialist countries the private sector is 'accused of consisting of cartels and monopolies, and capitalists branded for their failure to understand and sympathise with people's aspirations'[1]. Therefore, in order to eliminate mass poverty, the government may find it imperative to control the private sector through at least partial public ownership. In certain cases there may be a general distrust of free enterprise.

The second type of reason can be referred to as social and political. This includes: (1) the reduction of ethnic and regional economic imbalances; (2) the desire of the political party in power to control the economy and thereby maintain the desired balance of political power; (3) the reduction of rural-urban imbalances; (4) the provision of basic services such as water, power, transportation and communication; and (5) the reduction of dependence on foreign capital and management by purchasing foreign enterprises.[2] The third set of reasons can be referred to as situational necessities. These include: (1) a lack of private entrepreneurship in the country; (2) reluctance on the part of private investors to risk their capital in heavy projects such as shipyards, heavy chemical industries and steel manufacturing; (3) the need for choosing an appropriate technology, a task which can be more effectively undertaken by the government; (4) the need to control certain types of enterprises, defence oriented industries for example, which cannot be left entirely to the private sector for strategic reasons; (5) and to provide a needed service which may be unprofitable under private operation.[3]

Public Enterprises in the Malaysian Economy

By the end of 1974, there were 45 public enterprises in Malaysia owned by the federal government with 37 wholly owned subsidiaries and 93 joint stock

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[1]Abu Sharaf H. K. Sadique, 'Coordination and Control of Public Enterprises: An Overview of the Asian Experience' in Sadique ed, *Public Enterprises in Asia: Studies on Coordination and Control* (— Kuala Lumpur: Asian Centre for Development Administration, 1976), p 7.

[2]*Ibid*, pp 5-12.

[3]*Ibid*.

ventures. Furthermore, there were 37 public enterprises owned by various state governments with 28 wholly-owned subsidiaries and 92 joint ventures.[1] This is a phenomenal increase given the fact that at the time of independence in 1957 there were only 10 public enterprises.

Despite the fact that Malaysia is committed to free enterprise, the public sector plays a vital role in the economy. This is evident from the growth of the public sector since 1957. The public development expenditure in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75), for example, has been estimated to be seven times larger than during the First Malaya Plan (1956-60).[2] Public investment has been planned to reach 45% of the total investment during the Second Plan Period. The public sector's rapid expansion has been accompanied by an increasingly significant role of public enterprises in the economy. There has been a substantial increase in the public corporations' rate of capital formation.

The rapid expansion of public enterprises in Malaysia, their place in the national economy, and their underlying objectives can be better understood within the historical socio-political context. A significant factor in this regard was the existence of inter-ethnic income disparities in Malaya at the time of independence. In the Household Budget Survey of the Federation of Malaya 1957-58, it was reported that while 75% of Malay households in rural areas received a total monthly income of M$150[3] or less, only 23.5% of the Chinese households in rural areas took in that small a sum.[4] There also existed regional economic imbalance. Rural areas were poorer than urban areas. States like Kelantan, Pahang, Kedah and Trengganu were less developed than many West Coast States like Penang and Selangor. Regional imbalance coincided with ethnic imbalance because the Malays were heavily concentrated in the rural areas and the less developed states while the non-Malays had gravitated to urban areas and the urbanized states.[5] After independence, early steps undertaken by the Alliance Party for reducing inter-ethnic, inter-regional, and rural-urban disparities were discernible in the First and Second Five Year Plans, 1956-60 and 1961-65, respectively, and the First Malaysia Plan, 1966-1970. Governmental intervention in the economy took place through newly established public enterprises in the agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors.

By the end of the 1960s it was becoming apparent that the economic terms of the constitutional bargain between Malays and non-Malays under which the former were granted 'special rights' had not been successfully implemented. Neither the

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[1]Raja Mohd. Affandi bin Raja Halim, 'Coordination of Public Enterprises: Country Study for Malaysia' in Sadique ed, *op cit*, p 366.

[2]M. C. Puthucheary, 'Coordination of Public Enterprises: Country Study for Malaysia' in Sadique ed, *op cit*, p 419.

[3]*$M 4.35=£1* Ed.
New: Ringits 3.925=£1

[4]Karl Von Vorys, *Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p 219.

[5]Affandi *op cit*, p 368.

economic conditions of Malays nor inter-ethnic economic disparities had substantially changed. This was later verified when it was reported that in 1970 the mean household monthly income of Malays was M$178.7, that of Chinese M$387.4, and that of Indians M$310.4. Of those households having an income of less than one hundred Malaysian dollars, 85.5% were Malay, only 9.6% Chinese, and 4.9% Indian.[1] The government's efforts to make Malays effective participants in commerce and industry did not seem to have had significant impact. The ownership of share capital by Malays and Malay interests was only 2% of the total. Although foreign interests accounted for 61% of the total share, the Chinese owned 60% of the total Malaysian share.[2]

Discontentment on the part of the Malay electorate, which had been considerably politicized, was demonstrated in the 1969 general election. The Alliance Party's share of votes in West Malaysia was reduced from 58.5% in 1964 to 49.1%. The May 1969 racial riots, which took place immediately after the election, have been attributed to many factors.[3] The most significant reason, however, was the frustration of Malays at the slow pace with which the government was implementing programs designed to improve their economic situation. It was under these circumstances that the New Economic Policy was formulated to 'reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians . . .' and to accelerate 'the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function.'[4] The role of public enterprises in reducing inter-ethnic economic imbalance and promoting regional development has been emphasized in the Second Malaysia Plan, 1970-75, as follows:[5]

> The Government will participate more directly in the establishment and operation of a wide range of productive enterprises. This will be done through wholly-owned enterprises and joint ventures with the private sector: The necessity for such efforts by the Government arises particularly from the aims of establishing new industrial activities in selected new growth areas and of creating a Malay commercial and industrial community.

Under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) the government continues to utilize public enterprises as the main instrument for restructuring Malaysian society. As Table 1 shows there has been a significant increase in the allocation of public development expenditure among major public enterprises.

In addition to reducing inter-ethnic economic disparities, the establishment of public enterprises in Malaysia has two other objectives. One of these is to provide infrastructural and supporting services to the private sector. The other entails

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[1] *Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1973). p 4.

[2] *Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75* (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1971), p 40.

[3] The events leading to the May 1969 riots and their underlying causes have been documented in many works. See, for example, Gordon P. Means, *Malaysian Politics* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976); Tunku Abdul Rahman, *May 13, Before and After* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1969); and Goh Cheng Teik, *The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971).

[4] *Second Malaysia Plan, op cit,* p 1.

[5] *Ibid,* p 7.

setting up government owned companies and corporations in order to avoid government procedures or to ensure managerial flexibility. It should be noted, however, that there does not seem to be any distinct ideological rationale for the establishment of public enterprises in Malaysia.[1] In fact, commitment to free enterprise continues to exist. The creation of public enterprises is mainly attributable to economic and social considerations.

TABLE 1 *Allocation of public development expenditure among major public enterprises*

		$ *Million* *1966-70*	*1971-75*	*1976-80*
I	**Land Development**			
	1 Federal Land Development Authority	248.4	645.1	985.0
	2 Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority	25.4	49.4	85.5
	3 Land Development Boards		164.8	497.1
	4 Jengka Triangle		107.8	96.2
	5 Pahang Tenggara Development Authority		47.3	142.2
	6 Johore Tenggara Development Authority		40.1	89.4
	7 Trengganu Tengah Development Authority		5.5	63.5
II	**Credit & Marketing**			
	1 Bank Pertanian	3.0	50.0	75.8
	2 Farmers' Organization Authority		17.6	95.3
	3 Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority	10.4	4.9	26.9
	4 National Padi & Rice Authority	9.3	56.6	29.4
III	**Commerce & Industry**			
	1 Perbadanan Nasional	10.0	150.0	200.0
	2 Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat	50.9	205.3	315.0
	3 State Economic Development Corporations		227.5	423.8
	4 Urban Development Authority		194.5	217.0
	5 Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd.	16.0	100.0	—

Source: Abstracted from R. Tillainathan, 'Public Enterprises in Malaysia - Problems and Prospects', Third Malaysian Economic Convention, 1976, p 3.

[1]Affandi, *op cit*, p

Organizational Types

There are four forms of organization for the administration of public enterprises. The first and oldest form is that of a normal government department staffed by career government personnel. It is generally used for the administration of national services or monopolies such as railway and postal services. The second form may be referred to as a public corporation in which the 'administrative authority to conduct a specific enterprise or group of enterprises is given, usually by statute, to a corporate body appointed by the Government, employing its own staff and with complete or nearly complete freedom from governmental control in its day-to-day operations'.[1] The third form is that of a state company established 'under the ordinary company law of the country concerned, in which the government has a controlling interest through its ownership of all or some of its shares'.[2] The fourth method of running a public enterprise is that of an 'operating contract'. Under this device the government enters into a contract with an established private company for the management of an enterprise. The contractor is compensated for his services and costs and may even be allowed to invest a substantial amount of capital in the enterprise. Each of these forms is designed to achieve a different balance between the goals of operational autonomy and governmental control. While the first form maximizes control and minimizes operational flexibility, the third and fourth forms do the opposite. The second form attempts to achieve a balance between the two apparently conflicting goals.

In Malaysia, examples of departmental enterprises are the Public Works Department, the Telecommunication Department, and the Postal Department. The administration of these departments is almost identical with that of regular government departments or ministries. In matters dealing with personnel, finance, and other operations, these enterprises are governed by civil service rules and procedures. Many development agencies in Malaysia are organized as public corporations. These are in the agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors at the national, regional, and state levels. By the end of 1974 there were 59 such public enterprises. Examples of public corporations in Malaysia are the Urban Development Authority (UDA) and the National Padi and Rice Authority (NAPRA). Public enterprises in this category are established under their respective incorporating legislations.

Companies in Malaysia are established under general companies legislation. in 1974 there were 10 wholly owned and 13 partially owned companies. In addition all of the 65 wholly owned subsidiaries and the 185 joint ventures were organized in the form of companies. Examples of such public enterprises are Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS: National Corporation), the Federal Industrial Marketing Authority (FIMA) and Bank Bumiputra. The fourth organizational type has only recently been experimented with in the public sector. PERNAS

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[1]United Nations, *A Handbook of Public Administration* (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, 1961), p 73.

[2]A. H. Hanson, *Public Enterprises and Economic Development* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p 351.

has acquired 50% of the shares in Far Eastern Hotels Development (M) Berhad which owns the Kuala Lumpur Hilton Hotel.

In the past the government has generally used the corporation form of organization for regional development agencies, public utilities, agricultural enterprises, etc. and the company form for financial, trading and manufacturing enterprises.[1] Raja Affandi has presented two explanations for the organizational type chosen for particular activities.[2] First, for those enterprises which were established to perform some regulatory function, the public corporation form was chosen. The examples are UDA which is empowered to declare a certain urban area as an urban development area and NAPRA which is authorized to licence all trade dealing with rice. The second criteria deals with the question of public ownership. Public corporations are wholly owned by the government and are likely to continue in this fashion in the future as well. Companies were usually partially owned by the government. In the case of wholly owned companies, the government eventually intends to transfer all or part of the ownership to Malays.

Management

In both the public corporations and state companies in Malaysia the boards of directors are at the top of the organization as the policy making body. The membership of these boards ranges from 3 to 16. In the case of public corporations the membership of the board of directors is specified in the incorporating legislation. As regards state companies, membership consists of a chairman and a general manager, representatives of the federal or state treasury, a supervising organization and shareholders, political appointees, and members appointed for their competence in a particular field. Appointments to these boards are made on the basis of three factors: (1) To ensure control, by appointing representatives of supervising organizations; (2) To ensure competence, by appointing a general manager and people with specialized knowledge; and (3) To ensure representation by appointing shareholders and politicians.[3] In the case of departmental enterprises, there are no boards. These enterprises are headed by a director general who is responsible to the minister.

Below the board are the general manager or director general and departmental heads. In theory, the general manager is appointed by the board. In practice, however, this is subject to approval by the minister concerned as well as the prime minister. The board is empowered to appoint the enterprise's top level management.

The relationship between the chairman of the board, members, and the general manager, depends largely upon the managerial organization of the public enterprise. In certain cases the chairman of the board occupies a full time appointment. In others, the general manager is not a member of the board.

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[1] Affandi, *op cit*, p 382.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid*, p 383.

In cases such as PERNAS, the chairmanship of the board is combined with general managership. Usually, however, the general manager holds the dominant position since (1) ordinary board membership is not a full-time job, (2) the chairman of the board does not usually occupy a full-time appointment, (3) some of the members may be too busy to assume active control of the public enterprise. Therefore, as Thillainathan points out, "(i) most boards may turn out to be policy boards whose members do not exercise any 'functional' responsibilities within the enterprise; and (ii) real authority (or such authority as is delegated by the Minister) is likely to gravitate into the hands of the general manager who has a full-time appointment vis-a-vis the board."[1]

Finance

There are five possible sources of finance for public enterprises in Malaysia. First, the government may provide grants, loans or share participation. The administrative costs of public corporations such as the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), UDA, and NAPRA are met by government grants. In the case of FELDA, such grants constituted one third of the total direct funds channeled by the Federal Government between 1956–71. Government loans are provided to finance the 'development costs' of various projects and schemes undertaken by the corporations. The government loan may be interest bearing and repayable or interest bearing but non-repayable or non-interest bearing but repayable. In the case of companies, the government provides finance by buying shares in the enterprise. In PERNAS, for example, government is the sole shareholder while in other enterprises such as Malayan Banking, government is the major shareholder, with rest of the shares belonging to the private sector.

A second possible source of finance for public enterprises is through borrowing from local and foreign private sector financial institutions. The prior approval of the Minister for Finance is needed for such borrowing. Lembaga Letrik Negara (LLN: National Electricity Board), the Malaysian Airline System (MAS) and FELDA are examples of enterprises which have in the past obtained part of their financing through borrowed funds. The third source of finance is the public issue of shares. This too requires the approval of the treasury. PERNAS raises part of the equity capital of its subsidiaries through this source. However, the shares of some other companies, MAS for example, are not open to the public. The fourth possible source is the 'ploughing back' of profits. Though most public enterprises in Malaysia are too recent in origin to be self-financing, some, such as LLN, earn profits which are ploughed back. The need for self-financing is increasingly being emphasized. The State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs), for example, are forced to opt for commercially viable projects to enable them to be self-financing. Other enterprises such as the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA), and various training institutions are not, due to the nature of their functions, expected to be self-financing.

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[1]R. Thillainathan, 'Malaysia' in Nguyen Troung, ed, *The Role of Public Enterprise in National Development in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects* (Singapore: Regional Institute of Higher Education and Development, 1976), p 96.

Not all public enterprises finance their programs and activities from all of the aforementioned sources. Rather, it depends upon the type of public enterprise. As a general rule departmental enterprises, and to a certain extent, public corporations are dependent upon government grants and loans. In each case, however, there is some degree of financial control.

The budget of departmental enterprises is incorporated into the state budget for presentation to the Parliament. Its disbursement is subject to hierarchical approval. Public corporations and state companies, however, are given greater operational flexibility. They are provided with the initial capital which is under their own control and subject to supervision as specified in the incorporating legislation. They are not subjected to rigid estimating or appropriation controls.

Personnel

As mentioned earlier, in departmental enterprises civil service procedures and rules are followed in matters dealing with recruitment, remuneration, and promotion, thereby allowing a minimum of flexibility in devising personnel policies and structure. Conversely, government companies have maximal flexibility in this regard since the boards of directors and management are authorized to formulate their own policies dealing with personnel. These companies follow the practice of private enterprises, and have their own policies for recruitment, remuneration, grading, classification, promotion and discipline. In public corporations, boards of directors are authorized to formulate their own policies dealing with personnel. In actual practice, however, public corporations usually follow the practices of government departments since (1) the corporation's personnel policies have to be approved by the appropriate minister who in turn, often refers the matter to the Public Services Department and (2) many top level officers in the corporation are seconded from the civil service and tend therefore to suggest that government policies be followed.[1]

Coordination

The major areas in which coordination between public enterprises is considered necessary include general policy, investment, pricing policies, use of surpluses, performance criteria, personnel policies, and public relations and information. In discussion the rationale for coordinating public enterprises, a UN study points out five factors.[2] First, in order to make the most efficient use of limited resources and to avoid wastage, it is essential to examine the policy implications of public enterprises in a coordinated manner at the national level. Secondly, due to the rapid proliferation of public enterprises, it is likely that their activities may conflict or that they may follow conflicting policies. Thirdly, in some cases more than one enterprise with overlapping objectives and functions may be established. In order to avoid duplication and conflicting policies in such enterprises, mechanisms for coordination are essential. Fourthly, to achieve the specified social and political objectives, it is essential to have a uniform wage and personnel policies as well as pricing policies for goods produced by these enterprises.

[1]Affandi, *op cit*, p 385.
[2]Sadique, *op cit*, pp 18–19.

Finally, coordination is necessary to enable various public enterprises to assist one another by establishing effective linkages and thereby to deal with international situations in cooperation with each other.

The need to have effective institutional mechanisms at the national level for coordinating public enterprises has long been recognized in Malaysia. Over the years a number of agencies have been established to perform this task. The National Development Planning Committee (NDPC), established in 1961, is responsible for the formulation, implementation, progress evaluation, and revision of development plans submitted by all government agencies and public enterprises. The NDPC consists of the Chief Secretary to the government as the chairman and representatives of various ministries and agencies. It controls the development budget and is empowered to make recommendations to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet regarding allocations for any new development projects undertaken by public enterprises. In this process the NDPC attempts to coordinate activities and prevent duplication at the planning stage.

Another agency involved in coordination at the planning stage is the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in the Prime Minister's Department. Before undertaking new projects, government agencies submit their proposals through their ministries to the EPU which processes them and makes recommendations to the NDPC. Since there are representatives of EPU in NDPC, it is in a position to perform the task of coordinating various programs.

In 1962 the National Operations Room Technique was evolved. The objective of the Operations Room was to keep progress reports of various projects by government agencies and public enterprises. Under this scheme the representatives of public enterprises were called upon to brief the Minister of National and Rural Development in regard to their activities, successes and difficulties. These briefings served the purpose of coordinating public enterprises at the implementation stage. In 1969 the Committee for Coordination of State Economic Development Corporations was established to supervise the granting of loans to SEDCs. The Committee consisted of the Director of Budget from the Treasury and representatives from the ministry of trade and industry and EPU.

Following the launching of the Second Malaysia Plan and the subsequently increased role of public enterprises, a greater need was felt for a more systematic approach in coordinating public enterprises. Therefore, in 1971 the National Action Council (NAC) and the Executive Committee of the NAC were established to supervise the implementation of development projects under the plan. In effect the Executive Committee of the NAC became the coordinating body for all government departments as well as public enterprises. In addition to the two aforementioned agencies, the Implementation and Coordination Unit (ICU) was established in order to, among other things, act as the coordinating machinery for ministries, departments and public enterprises; to service the meetings of the Executive Committee; and to monitor the implementation of development programs. The ICU arranges for the briefing sessions in which all the relevant public enterprises, ministries, and departments are called before

the Executive Committee of NAC to present their progress reports, successes and difficulties. In these sessions, the evaluation reports from the relevant public enterprises and ministries are compared with independent evaluation reports by the ICU. As a result of these briefings the Executive Committee makes decisions regarding the coordination of activities and policies of all government organizations and public enterprises.

In 1974, the Ministry of Public Enterprises was established to monitor and coordinate the policies, programs and projects of 8 major public enterprises at the federal level and 13 at the state level. The public corporations which this ministry is responsible for coordinating include: UDA, MARA, Development Bank, PERNAS, National Savings Bank, NAPRA, Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd. (MIDF), Food Industries Malaysia, and 13 State Economic Development Corporations. The Ministry of Public Enterprises approves the annual budgets of all federal public enterprises under its jurisdiction. All other public enterprises remain under the auspices of their respective ministries. The ICU, however, continues to coordinate the policies and activities of all public enterprises by serving as the secretariat of the Executive Committee of the NAC.

To sum up, most public enterprises in Malaysia are under the jurisdiction of ministries with related functions. A select few at the national and the state levels are the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Enterprises. In addition to these ministries, the supervision and coordination of public enterprises at the planning stage lies primarily with EPU, NDPC, and the NEC and at the implementation stage with ICU and the Executive Committee of the NAC.

Control

Closely related to the issues of coordination are those of control. The distinction between coordination and control is that while the former does not necessarily involve the direct power of sanction, the latter requires mechanisms for direct supervision. The distinction between the two concepts is perhaps arbitrary since without some power of sanction, coordination may be difficult to achieve. The two concepts should, nevertheless, be separated since not all issues involved in, and reasons for the two are identical. A UN study points out the following reasons for exercising public control over public enterprises: (1) to ensure the achievement of specified goals; (2) to protect the government's interest as an investor in the public enterprise; (3) to ensure that public enterprises do not incur losses; (4) the strategic importance of some public enterprises for the politico-bureaucratic system; (5) the refusal of public enterprise executives to accept responsibility for or to make decisions on matters within their legal jurisdiction; (6) and the lack of specificity regarding an enterprise's objectives.[1]

In Malaysia, control over public enterprises is exercised by the sponsoring ministry, the Prime Minister's Department, Treasury, Public Services Department, and the Parliament. In the case of public corporations, the minister is empowered to appoint and remove the chairman and members of the Board of

[1] *Ibid*, pp 34–38.

Directors; to give directions of a general character consistent with the incorporating legislation; and to call for a periodic review of projects undertaken by public enterprises. In wholly owned companies the government makes the nominations. In actual practice, the extent of ministerial control 'varies greatly from one enterprise to another depending on the minister or whether the enterprise is performing politically sensitive functions or not.'[1] In addition, the status of the chief executive of the public enterprise and his accessibility to the top level political leaders are also crucial in determining the amount of ministerial intervention.[2]

The agencies in the Prime Minister's Department involved in controlling public enterprises include EPU, and ICU. In addition, those public corporations which depend on federal government grants for their operating expenses are required to submit their budget estimates through their respective ministry to the treasury. These are processed in an almost identical manner as those from government departments. Since public enterprises in Malaysia depend considerably upon the federal government for development expenditure, the role of the treasury becomes crucial. The treasury scrutinizes all applications for loans from public enterprises. Under loan agreements, public enterprises agree to provide quarterly or half yearly reports on the progress of their projects. Furthermore, the treasury has representatives on the boards of directors of public enterprises to give them an overview of the government's financial policy. The control exercised by the treasury is aimed at ensuring efficient use of government funds and the repayment of loans and interest by public enterprises. Another central agency involved in controlling public enterprises is the Public Services Department. Senior staff on public enterprises are seconded from the government, thereby curtailing the autonomy of public enterprises in dealing with personnel matters.

Theoretically, public enterprises are under the scrutiny and control of the legislature. In actual practice, however, the accountability of public enterprises to the legislature is curtailed by many factors. First, the opposition is ineffective and does not have access to all the information. Secondly, there is considerable ministerial intervention in the decisions of the board of management of various public enterprises. The ministers are not accountable to the legislature for such decisions since these are matters concerning the enterprises internal management. Thirdly, in the case of state companies, many of them do not come under the scrutiny of Parliament since they are responsible only to their shareholders.[3]

Concluding Comments

Over the years a number of problems have emerged in the functioning of public enterprises in Malaysia. Some of these can be summarized as follows: First, despite the existence of elaborate machinery, both at the planning and implementation stage, the coordination of public enterprises has been complex and

[1]Puthucheary, *op cit*, p 430.

[2]*Ibid.*

[3]Thillainathan, *op cit*, p 109.

difficult to achieve. This explains why in the last decade considerable changes in the mechanisms for coordination have been made. Secondly, in the past, public enterprises have experienced a shortage of skilled and professional staff, thereby negatively affecting their performance. Thirdly, in some cases there is vagueness concerning the powers of management, board of directors, and the minister concerned, leading to ministerial intervention in the decision-making process which in turn, may negatively affect the operational flexibility of the public enterprise and, furthermore, may substitute political criteria for economic ones. Fourthly, the rapid expansion of public enterprises in Malaysia as an instrument for restructuring society has restricted the access of private capitalists in various activities such as land alienation, transport, trading etc. Finally, the rapid increase in the number of public enterprises has led to overlapping and duplication of functions in many areas of activity.

In view of the government's commitment to restructuring Malaysian society by eliminating inter-ethnic income disparities, public enterprises will inevitably continue, in the foreseeable future, to perform a vital role in the national economy. In order to facilitate the effective performance of public enterprises, and indeed the success of the government's development strategy, various steps need to be undertaken. These include: giving greater operational flexibility to public enterprises in matters dealing with finance, personnel, and program implementation; further clarifying the powers of management, the board of directors, and the minister; reducing political intervention, in particular at the implementation stage; integrating those public enterprises performing almost identical functions; and empowering the Ministry of Public Enterprises to coordinate the activities of all public enterprises at the national level.

Co-operatives and the Poor

PETER YEO*

Whatever else Co-operatives lack, there is no shortage of good writing about their ability to help the poor in developing countries. The motive for writing yet more on the subject is that so much of the attention so far has been concentrated primarily on two questions. People examine the historical record and find that many Co-operatives in developing countries have failed to help the poor. They also discuss whether Co-operatives are suitable instruments for helping the poor. Not nearly so much has been written about what Co-operatives should *do now* to make themselves as beneficial as possible *to* the poor.

This paper concentrates on the question of what is to be done now. The reason is that it is an 'insider's' paper, written by someone who teaches Co-operative workers from developing countries. At the International Co-operative Training Centre, Loughborough both teachers and course members know that we receive our salaries because those who pay us believe that Co-operatives should and can help the poor to help themselves. This gives an urgency to our attempts to identify the guidelines for ensuring that their faith is justified.

We have a vested interest in the matter, but, we don't have to feel too selfish about it. We can see that there are plenty of poor people in developing countries clinging to the same raft. They have been encouraged to put their effort and savings into Co-operatives. Too often defects in the raft or in the surrounding elements have prevented them from making much progress. However, for virtually all of them, there is no vessel in sight which has demonstrated that it is more reliable. Till something better is available, we can only try to make the raft we are on as seaworthy as possible.

Earlier versions of this paper were used as discussion notes with groups of experienced Co-operative workers from many countries. It is to course members and colleagues at the International Co-operative Training Centre that the main acknowledgement is due.

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Members only

A good rule to start with is that Co-operatives should never be ordered to help people who are not members, except where the obligation to help falls equally on similar people who are not organised in Co-operatives. Successful Societies can decide voluntarily to give part of their surplus to public purposes, such as the building of a clinic or school. Such generosity can be justified in purely commercial terms, since it is often excellent as public relations. What is objectionable is pressure from above to engage in public benefaction. Obviously cases where the pressure is applied to Co-operatives which cannot afford to respond are particularly bad.

This rule against compulsory helping of non-members is broken surprisingly often. It is broken whenever a politician or a government official commandeers a Co-operative vehicle, however laudable the purpose for which it is borrowed. It is broken when a Co-operative is pushed into devoting time and other resources to welcoming official visitors. The few successful Co-operative farms in the world seem to be particularly attractive to locust-like plagues of visitors. It is broken when a Co-operative institution is pushed into making loans to people who were not previously members, on terms which a commercial bank would not offer. It is broken when Co-operatives are used for experiments with fertilisers or seeds. It is fashionable at the moment to break it by directing Co-operatives to associate themselves with family planning programmes in ways which can be costly in terms of member loyalty.

Actions of this type may often be motivated by a wish that the Co-operative should help poor people who are not members. In practice, they make potential members reluctant to join for fear of exposing themselves to these depradations. They destroy faith in the possibility of democratic control. The result is the failure of many a Co-operative which might otherwise have been able to help the poor amongst its own members.

Strangely, it is often government aid to Co-operatives which opens the door to abuses of this kind. If public money has helped a Co-operative, or if a Co-operative has been granted special privileges by government, it becomes easier to argue that its resources should be available for public purposes. Unfortunately, the damage which results may outweigh any benefit from the original government aid.

Getting them in

These limitations on what Co-operatives can do for those who are not members are made more significant by another rule, which is that people should not be encouraged to join Societies which will not benefit them. At one level, this is obvious. For example, Marketing Societies are not for subsistence farmers and Agricultural Service Societies are not for the landless. In practice, the rule is broken in more subtle ways. Farmers who only grow small quantities of a certain crop are encouraged to join a Society which offers processing facilities, although it may not be economic to send a small harvest off the farm for processing. People

are encouraged to join Societies offering production credit although marketing difficulties make it unlikely that they will produce profitably.

Given that joining a Co-operative would be beneficial to particular poor people, the problem of raising the share capital needed for entry has to be overcome. A proposal made in Bangladesh in 1976 may be helpful.[1] It is that share capital demanded can be related to the potential use the prospective member could make of the Society. For example, it can be linked to acreage of land or to the number of animals. A common variant, which works well in some Societies in Britain, is to have a small share requirement but to demand a qualifying loan of variable size. There is also, in many countries, the practice of postponing collection of the full payment until it can be deducted for dividend payment or other monies due to the member.

Who leads?

When the poor do join a Co-operative, they are unlikely to come unaided to leadership positions.* Sometimes, the domination of Societies by richer members does not matter very much. People who have made themselves rich, may have the ability to direct the Society well. They may even have the integrity to do so. They may have more leisure and education than poorer members. Since remoteness is often a cause of poverty, the richer members tend to live closer to the Society's headquarters and thus to be more readily available for committee meetings. Sometimes, one has to accept, however reluctantly, that the handicaps which keep people poor would also mean that no Co-operative which they ran would be successful enough to benefit them. If the choice is between domination by richer members and no Co-operative, it can be better to accept the first.

However, it is often desirable to move closer to the Co-operative ideal, which is that all members should be active in controlling their Society, regardless of their income. For one thing, the poor frequently need a strong voice to make sure that the Co-operative pays heed to their needs, in the many cases where these differ from those of their richer neighbours. For another, as President Nyerere has written, 'People cannot be developed, they can only develop themselves' and, 'A man develops himself by joining in the discussion of a new venture, and by participating in the subsequent decision; he is not being developed if he is herded like an animal into a new venture'.[2]

The problem of helping poorer people into leadership positions in Societies where richer people are also available for office does not seem to have been

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[1] *Programme for Co-operative Education and Management Systems in Bangladesh – Report from the Intergovernmental Unit and the Project Preparation Committee* (Bangladesh, March 1976), p 180.

*In the author's view the problem is serious in the more densely populated countries where he who has land is already richer than he who is landless (Ed.).

[2] J. K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development* (Oxford University Press, 1973), p 60. In 1830, Dr Wm King made a similar point specifically about Co-operatives. See *The Co-operator* No 21 reprinted in T. W. Mercer, *Co-operation's Prophet and the Co-operator* (Co-operative Union Ltd., Manchester, 1947).

solved in many places. The first problem is how to develop in the poor enough confidence to stand for office. Some people claim that this can be done by educational programmes based on a proper understanding of group dynamics.[1] There is more widespread evidence that this is an area where people learn best by 'doing'. Self-confidence in public comes to many people with practice. An example of this is the way in which some working-class women in Britain learnt the skills and confidence needed to play an active part in other democratic institutions through participation in Women's Guilds. Similar auxiliary organisations, for the poor of both sexes, might be useful beside Co-operatives in less developed countries.

In India, at least one state has tried reserving seats on management committees of Co-operatives for, 'weaker sections'. The Registrar has the power to nominate people to these seats if they are not filled by election.[2] It would be interesting to know how useful such legislation has proved in practice. One difficulty in most places would be to identify those entitled to the privileges reserved for, 'weaker sections'. This must present problems unless poverty is firmly linked to some visible characteristic, such as skin colour.

It is possible to go further and exclude richer people, or certain categories of richer people, from office. They can even be excluded from membership. It seems reasonable to say that only cultivators of land should be eligible for membership of an Agricultural Society, so that tenants are admited in preference to their landlords.[3] It is normal to exclude those who do business which competes with that of the Co-operatives; for example, a shop keeper would normally be excluded from the committee of a Consumer Co-operative and a money lender from a Credit Co-operative. Such prohibitions are useful but it is difficult to exclude the controlled nominees of prohibited people. That is why it will often happen, as Akhter Hameed Khan wrote of Bangladesh, that, 'Having failed to kill the project from outside, the veterans are now trying to kill it from inside'.[4]

If the duties of leadership are onerous, the rich *may be* less willing than the poor to take them on. The rich person could have earned more in the time given up for the Co-operative. There are several reasons for emphasising *may be* and for doubting whether leadership duties should often deliberatly be made onerous for this purpose. Even though alternative uses for a poor person's time would earn less cash, this little may be essential for survival. Only those rich who are currently working full-time need lose by running a Co-operative. Finally, poor people who take office in a Co-operative often learn thereby how to expand their own business. Their time becomes more valuable to them. They become less

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[1]For a very striking claim for the effectiveness of group motivational training with Co-operatives in Ecuador. See Ramiro Leon, *New Methods in Cooperative Education* (International Cooperative Training Journal, Wisconsin), Vol 4, Nos 3 & 4, 1970.

[2]*Recent Trends in Co-operative Legislation* (Background Paper for Indian Co-operative Congress, February 1976), p 14.

[3]As 1, p 178.

[4]Akhter Hameed Khan, *Tour of Twenty Thanas* (Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1971).

willing to spend time on the Co-operative and also less representative of poor members.

Whatever rules are made to exclude unsuitable leaders should be made right at the beginning of a Society's existence. Certainly they must be made before the elections to which they are applied. Attempts to change rules to displace those who are already in power are nearly always counter-productive. The members are likely to unite against the interference from outside. They start defending the very leaders about whom they had previously complained.

Blanket exclusion of all those who are socially or economically different from the membership for which the Society is designed is both unenforceable and undesireable. Almost all Co-operatives which have ever achieved anything for poor people have, somewhere in their history, a leader more privileged than the typical member. These outsiders have often played an indispensable role in the success of the Co-operative.[1] Sometimes they have worked as patrons or advisers and sometimes as managers. It would be a loss if it became impossible for such people to work from within as members.

Ideally, the members should be educated to look after themselves by electing suitable leaders. This education is no cure-all. If votes are controlled by the power of money-lenders or landlords, education won't change things. It can be effective against irrational deferrence, parochialism or laziness, all of which are common reasons why poor people vote for those who will exploit them. One useful form of education is to present accounts and annual reports in such a way that the members can judge the performance of their outgoing committee and vote accordingly. This may mean that the members have to hear the information rather than read it. Another possibility, appropriate to Credit Societies, is that the members should receive a list of all loans and advances made to members of the committee or to their relations.[2] If this list also contains details of overdue repayments, it will often show the members who not to vote for.

It is worth investigating whether the poor would benefit in some cases if those rules were abolished which prevent two Co-operatives from carrying on the same business in the same area. There may be positive economies of scale if all are brought together in one Co-operative but, on the other hand, it seems wrong to deny those whose interests are subordinated in one Co-operative the opportunity to found another Society.[3]

Another point is also related to the size of the Co-operatives. The poor cannot

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[1]Raiffeisen himself is a prime example. Also, he expected successful farmers to lead Co-operatives. See F. W. Raiffeisen, *The Credit Unions*, 1866. Page 61 in English Edition published 1970 by Raiffeisen Printing and Publishing Company, Neuwied, Germany.

[2]As 4, p 21.

[3]For advocacy of allowing two Co-operatives to operate in one area. See R. King, *Co-operative Policy in Peasant Societies – The Case of N. Nigeria* (Second Research Seminar, Plunkett Foundation, Oxford 1977).

possibly control something which is too complex for them to understand. Many British co-operators feel that the pursuit of efficiency through large size has put control of their Society into the hands of managers. How much more is this likely to apply in less developed countries where the members are less educated. Maybe the Co-operative method is only suitable for activities which can be carried out successfully by Societies which are small enough for the members to understand and control. A small Society which checks the weighing of cotton may do more for its members than a large one which owns a ginnery. There is often need for public control of the ginnery but this will not be achieved by labelling it 'Co-operative' and creating a fiction that is being governed by a mass membership of peasants.

Whatever the size of the Society, and whatever the complexity of its operations, high priority should be given to keeping all procedures which impinge on the membership as simple as possible. Often, a better alternative to teaching people to understand existing accounting procedures is to simplify the procedures so that they can be more readily understood – provided simplification does not make the funds less safe or make the records ineffective as a management instrument.

Equal treatment

It is important not to be too carried away by enthusiasm for ensuring that the poor receive equal treatment within the Co-operative. As soon as we go beyond this into positive discrimination in favour of the poor, we are treading on dangerous ground. Richer members may tolerate special electoral privileges for the poor. If the Co-operative also has to finance special economic privileges for the poorer members, those who are too rich to benefit will probably leave the Society. It will then cease to be able to benefit anyone, rich or poor.

The aim should usually be to treat all members alike, but identifying equal treatment is difficult. It often looks like privileges for the rich. Large orders are more economic than small ones, so discounts for quantity are equitable, although they only go to large farmers. It costs less to deliver to, or to collect from, those who live by better roads. If those who live by very bad roads receive service at the same charge, they are being subsidised by those fortunate enough to live on better roads. Private merchants will probably concentrate only on the most economic business. If the Co-operative offers the same terms to all, regardless of true cost, it will be greatly hampered in competition for the most lucrative business. Its ability to provide services to the poorer people will then be severely curtailed. If governments attempt to solve this problem by giving the Co-operatives a monopoly and excluding the private merchants, membership ceases to be really voluntary, since the farmers have nowhere else to turn. The chances that the Co-operative will then exploit its monopoly power by operating inefficiently are regrettably high. The best solution seems to be to educate the members into accepting that 'equal treatment' is not infringed by such things as discounts for quantity. Poor members can be encouraged to earn such discounts by pooling orders with neighbours. A rationing scheme may be needed to prevent people buying all the stock at a discount for resale from a monopoly position.

One firm rule about special help to poorer members of Co-operatives is that it should not be offered without the consent of the membership as a whole. If the government wishes such help to be given, it must first persuade the members to agree. The following quotation from the Indian 4th Five Year Plan breaks this rule:

> Co-operatives have been recognised as appropriate agencies of national policy as their operations are expected to be informed with a social purpose. It is important to ensure that co-operative organisations fully recognise this responsibility. It has at least two important aspects. First is that of functioning as democratic organisations and the second that of specially attending to the needs of the weaker among their members. The first can be and is in part ensured through provisions embodied in the constitution of organisations and through insisting on open membership. The second is a matter of policy and procedures. These are often found inappropriate. It is part of the responsibility of federal units in the co-operative system to look to these aspects and supply correctives where necessary. If they fail in this, Government may have to intervene.[1]

– How can the Co-operatives be told simultaneously to act democratically and to give special help to poorer members whether a majority votes for this or not? Also, in democratic Co-operative structures, the power of federals to 'supply correctives' to unwilling Primaries is very limited.

The late Dr Gadgil, who was on the Planning Commission, wrote something which suggests a further objection to the above passage. He wrote:

> I insisted that co-operation could be an instrument of helping Government policy but in areas where Government policy did not help the weaker sections or had not started development plans for the weaker sections, co-operatives could not accomplish the work. Co-operatives have not the resources or personnel for the needed research, money and material to bring about a transformation that even official policy had failed to bring about.[2]

If that is right, and it seems very convincing, there should surely have been an extra paragraph in the National Plan promising that the government would directly meet at least part of the costs of 'specially attending to the needs of the weaker among their members'. There was provision in the Plan for large amounts of public money to be spent on Co-operatives but the point which needs to be made is that meeting these costs is not a subsidy. It is merely payment to the Co-operatives for services rendered.

Government help

Although governments frequently need to put money into Co-operatives which they expect to help the poor, there is an obvious danger of pauperisation. The members easily come to think that they have no need to put their own resources into their Co-operative. To avoid this, some measure of self-help should be insisted on as a condition of help from government. The self-help required must be within the ability even of the poorest Society and yet demand effort

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[1] *Fourth Five Year Plan* (Planning Commission, Govt. of India, Sec 1.54).

[2] D. R. Gadgil, *Co-operation as an Instrument of Planned Development* (Maharashtra Co-operative Quarterly, Vol LIV, No 1, July 1970).

from the richest Society involved. There is no reason for it to cost the members money. It can take the form of labour, or of completing an education programme, or of exclusive use of the Co-operative for marketing. It is well exemplified by giving the Co-operative the frame and roof of a shop, but leaving the members to make the bricks and build the walls.

The most important help which Co-operatives must continue to receive from governments, if they are to have any chance of being useful to the poorest, comes from the much criticised Co-operative Department. Effective audit and inspection are absolutely essential to protect the poor from some of the leaders they democratically elect. A certain amount of paper work and accounts is not, as some suggest, a bureaucratic imposition. Rather, it is the best way to preserve and develop jointly owned assets.

Secondment of government officers to manage Co-operatives is much less useful. There are not many examples in developing countries of Co-operatives which have reverted to running themselves successfully after the government officer left. When the seconded officer moves in, the members are apt to lose any sense that the Society is theirs. Too frequently, in rural Societies, the seconded manager does not actually 'move in'. He commutes from where the schools for his children are good and the Society is left without continuous supervision either from him or from an active membership.

External constraints

It is a commonplace to observe that the causes of poverty are often far beyond the competence of Co-operatives to remedy. In the following quotation, the Director of the Internatioal Co-operative Alliance acknowledges this as clearly as any outside critic of Co-operatives. In an interview given to the *New Internationalist* he said,

> Certain preconditions need to be fulfilled - the spread of literacy, the construction of roads, the provision of services, and these are the responsibility of government. Land reform in particular is vital. But given these preconditions, it is perfectly feasible to apply the Co-operative techniques among even the poorest of the poor.[1]

In some countries, the existing government is not going to meet many of these conditions. Certainly, it is not going to carry out land reform. Nor will it break the stranglehold which merchants have on channels for marketing and credit. Under such circumstances anyone who agrees with the Director's analysis can only acknowledge that the Co-operatives will achieve nothing for the poor. Unfortunately, no other organisation will either. One can agree with those who say that in such countries nothing short of a radical change in the power structure will benefit the poor. There is, however, no reason to expect that something like Farmers Associations or small businesses can overcome the external constraints which defeat the Co-operatives.

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[1] *New Internationalist*, Feb 1977.

The greatest enthusiast for Co-operatives must also acknowledge that Co-operatives which provide services to separate businesses are likely to benefit most those who have the biggest enterprise. Lenin put it well when he wrote,

> . . . Out of every hundred households in our country, at least twenty own no cows at all; thirty own only one cow each; . . . The rich peasants, however, own three, four or more cows each. . . . Who then gains from Co-operative cheese dairies?[1]

Those who want to achieve lasting equality of income distribution must look to something other than Service Co-operatives. There is a small chance they might be able to achieve their objective through Co-operative Farms, though it is only rarely that these have been efficient and have not replaced one kind of exploitation with another.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has not been to make extravagant claims for the ability of Co-operatives to help the poor in less developed countries. On the contrary, it argues for recognition of the limitations on what Co-operatives can achieve. Part of the problem has been that too much has been expected of Co-operatives by people who had only a sketchy idea of what Co-operatives were. The way forward lies more through identifying the poor whom Co-operatives can help and how the job can best be done. The problems of the world's poor are not going to be solved quickly by any known remedy. Co-operatives are one of the institutions that can do something about some of them. This paper suggests guidelines for ensuring that this possibility more often becomes reality.

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[1]V. R. Lenin, *To the Rural Poor*, 1903.

Volcano in Tonga

JAMES LEWIS*

This account of volcanic eruption and subsequent evacuation in Tonga was given to James Lewis by Town Officer, Mr Moeake Takai, who kept a diary of events at the time, and to whom the author is deeply indebted. The author also wishes to acknowledge permission granted by the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Government of Tonga for the publication of this article.

The Kingdom of Tonga consists of 169 islands approximately 1000 miles north-east of New Zealand and 400 miles south-east of Fiji in the South Pacific Ocean. The island group extends over an area of 140,000 square miles, but with land area of 289 square miles – very much less than one per cent of the total. Only 36 islands are permanently inhabited, with a total population of 90,000 people, two-thirds of whom live on the principal island of Tongatapu. Natural hazards include tropical cyclone, drought, earthquake, tsunami and volcanic eruption. There are five islands which are active or dormant volcanoes, and two of these are amongst those permanently inhabited. The island of Niua Fo'ou is one of these, situated at the extreme north of the island group, almost 400 miles from Tongatapu and the capital, Nuku'alofa; 105 miles west from Niuatoputapu, the nearest island, and 215 miles north-west from Vava'u, the nearest island sub-group.

Their location at the extreme north of the island group places the islands of Niuatoputapu and Niua Fo'ou roughly mid-way between Fiji and Western Somoa. From the times of the earliest sea voyages, these islands became an important 'halfway house' for ships taking on stores and water. The early Dutch and Spanish explorers made use, or attempted to make use, of these islands in this way, as they had been for at least 1500 years previously by ocean voyagers, not only between two other countries of Fiji and Samoa but between the two civilisations of Micronesia and Polynesia. This strategic location has probably accounted in the past for the comparatively large populations of each of the two islands, as indicated by the ships of the Dutch explorer Le Maire being attacked in 1616 by a thousand men from Niuatoputapu, and later by

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'warriors in fourteen canoes' from Niua Fo'ou. In 1946 the population of Niua Fo'ou was 2500. Niuatoputapu is seven square miles in area. Niua Fo'ou is nineteen square miles, including a six square mile lake. Niua Fo'ou is volcanic and rises to 588 feet (see figure one). It has no natural harbour and for many years was called 'Tin Can Mail Island', because mail was dropped from passing ships in sealed tins and retrieved by swimmers.

It would be interesting to know what the effect of earlier eruptions in history have been on its large population, but records have only so far been traced back to 1929 when Niua Fo'ou erupted in July of that year and the village of Futu was destroyed, in addition to many houses and plantations. The need for improved communication was recognised by the Government as a result of this eruption, and a wireless station was established soon afterwards. Eruptions occurred again in 1935 (this time without damage), in 1936 destroying the village of Petani, again in 1943 and then another major eruption occurred in September 1946, and although there was no loss of life, damage was extensive. The wireless station established after the 1929 eruption was destroyed as were other government buildings, dwellings and plantations for the second time seriously during Queen Solote's reign. The decision was made by the Queen and her Government to evacuate the whole population, first to Tongatapu and then to the island of 'Eua.

In 1977, it was the island of 'Eua that suffered greatest damage from the earthquake of June 26th. In the following year, the Government of Tonga requested Technical Assistance in disaster mitigation from the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development, and it was during this assignment that a visit to 'Eua to inspect earthquake damage provided the opportunity to seek out whatever recollection was available of the eruption and evacuation of 1946. Tongans generally are traditional masters of oratory and written documentation, and Mr Moeake Takai, Town Officer at Angaha on 'Eua is no exception. Aged twenty at the time, he had always, and still does, keep a diary, and it was after reference to his diaries that he has described the events of that time.

Darkness falls early in the evenings in Tonga and there was a full moon in the evening of Monday, 9 September 1946. In Angaha, the principal village on the island, there was a brass band practice at the Catholic Mission, and Moeake Takai and his friend John Malekamu went to football practice. At 7.30 pm they felt the first earthquake, then there were two more and a total of probably ten or twelve minor tremors. The fourteen people at band-practice stopped playing and, in fear of an eruption, went to their homes. (Three years previously there had been an eruption on the far side of the island after only one earthquake, and on that occasion people had stayed where they were). Twenty-five minutes later, at five-minutes-to-eight, there was a loud roar from the western side of the village. Moeake Takai ran home and John Malekamu, who was operator at the government wireless station, reported for duty. Moeake Takai's mother and father had left their home and had joined others in climbing up the mountain away from the village on the coastline. He collected his

wife and did the same. People were crying and praying, calling to one another and shouting to find one another. There was a great deal of noise. When they had climbed up the mountain, they looked back but their village, the principal village on the island, had all gone. Where it had been was engulfed in black smoke. Climbing the mountain from the village appears to have been an instinctive reaction to escape known likely eruptions nearer the coastline. They were also instructed to do so by the police and the district officer. By eleven o'clock at night 'everyone' was on the mountain, including the district officer, the three police officers and the doctors, but with the exception of the wireless operator. The moonlight shone golden on white steam and on the black smoke. Ministers of all churches were conducting prayers together with the people, government officers, leaders and chiefs. Eventually at about three or four o'clock the eruption ceased, and Moeake Takai went down to look for his friend, the wireless operator. John Malekamu had sent out SOS signals for help and had left the wireless station only when lava was thirty feet away just before its destruction. Exhausted by the intense heat he had run and finally collapsed under a tree, where he was eventually found by his friend. Having realised that whether he lived or not was now 'up to God', he survived and was taken to rejoin the rest of the island community up the mountain. He was able to report to the police the extent of destruction in the village. At sunrise all joined in giving thanks to God for their deliverance – without casualty.

Among the two-and-a-half-thousand people on the mountain sides were four Sisters, one from Belgium, France and Holland, and one from the USA who had with her her national flag which was raised on the highest tree to attract attention. The eruption had commenced on the Monday evening and all the island community were gathered on the mountain sides by or during Tuesday, the following day. They remained there throughout Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday; and on Friday,14 September, at ten o'clock in the morning, a plane was heard. A US Navy plane flying from Pango Pango in Samoa to Na'adi in Fiji saw smoke still rising from the island and the waving of clothes on the mountain sides, and reported the situation at Na'adi. A message was sent to the Tonga Government at Nuku'alofa where none of the SOS messages from Niua Fo'ou itself seemed to have been received. The people remained where they were throughout Friday, and until Tuesday, 18 September when a government ship was at last sighted, one week and a day after the eruption. A cargo ship also arrived on the same day. At 4.30 in the afternoon a Government Officer arrived up the mountain to ask the people to move down again. A meeting was arranged between government officials arrived from Nuku'alofa, the Chief of Niua Fo'ou who had been in Nuku'alofa, and leaders of the island communities. On the following day a public meeting was arranged, where a government official expressed the need to evacuate the entire population to Tongatapu. The island communities are divided between four chiefs, and when the time came to vote on the issue of whether to agree to government evacuation or not, three Chiefs and their communities of 1800 people voted in favour of evacuation and one Chief and his 700 people voted against evacuation. Tonga has had a democratic form of government since 1875 however, and the majority vote in favour of evacuation meant evacuation for the whole island population of 2500 people.

The date of Saturday, 21 December 1946 was fixed for the commencement of evacuation to Tongatapu. The Police Magistrate from Nuku'alofa remained at Niua Fo'ou as Chairman of the Evacuation Committee and other officials returned to the capital. Although there was therefore the considerable time of three months to prepare for evacuaion, there was on the other hand, a lot of work to be done. All dwellings were to be taken down to permit reuse of building materials, and all material had to be stacked, ready for loading and embarkation.

When the day came, loading began at six o'clock in the morning and continued until five o'clock in the evening. 2500 people and building materials were transported to Nuku'alofa in one day. No animals were permitted to be taken, no food, and no sewing machines – only suitcases for clothing and personal belongings. Each person had been allocated a number, and each number was checked as embarkation progressed. It was an efficiently ordered occasion, but many people were crying and very upset. There had been, in fact, two eruptions, one adjacent to the principal village on land and the other just offshore. The landing place in between these two eruptions had been totally destroyed. Three boats came from Nuku'alofa for the evacuation. One was loaned by the US Government and another, the 'Matua', came from the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand. These two ships had to anchor three-quarters of a mile away from the shore and the third boat, a small wooden craft, the 'Hitofua', was used to ferry all passengers and goods from shore to ship.

Twenty-one men and one woman were left on Niua Fo'ou to tend crops and what property and belongings remained, but were there only from December to the following April. Life for them must have been particularly difficult, and they were eventually taken off by a Seventh Day Adventist Schooner to Samoa, from where they were eventually taken, still in the charge of the Minister on the boat to Vava'u, but the woman had been taken ill, and she died on board.

Tongatapu was to be only a transit stop. In September 1948 the move began to the island of 'Eua. The distance from Nuku'alofa is only twenty-five miles, but only the contingent of 1800 people who had voted, with their three chiefs, in favour of the evacuation agreed to go on to 'Eua. The other seven hundred, with their chief, stayed in Tongatapu; and in 1959 their requests to return to Niua Fo'ou were recognised, and the Government agreed to assist their return.

The island of 'Eua, with an area of thirty-four square miles, is one of the largest in the Tongan island group, but even now has only four thousand population, four per cent of the national total. The island is mountainous, rising to just over a thousand feet, naturally forested and with fresh water springs. 'Eua is larger, more fertile, and nearer to the capital than Niua Fo'ou but the first ten years were a very difficult time for the newly-arrived population. Agricultural land had to be cleared and crops and planting material had to be established. Forest timber, in government ownership, was not freely available and there were few coconut palms available for building. In 1957, a new sawmill was established with New Zealand development aid, and a forestry scheme established under which one quarter of all timber felled on farmed land was

made available to the allotted occupier. This marked a turning point in the island's relative prosperity and standard of living.

But in the intervening ten years, it had probably been severe economic hardship in unfamilar surroundings that caused seventy-four men to sail to Niua Fo'ou in 1950 to work on copra production. They stayed on the island for one year, then returning to 'Eua, being replaced by another working party in 1951, out of which twenty-four men stayed. In 1952, about twenty man stayed, and again in 1953. Moeake Takai joined one of these working parties and briefly reflected on the moving experience of a return to his native island. Animals had been untethered and freed by the last group of twenty-one to leave in 1947, and had since gone wild. The horses however responded to the long-forgotten sound of water buckets, and allowed themselves to be mounted to join in the work of coconut collection.

There was no permanent settlement on Niua Fo'ou from 1947 until 1959 and all land reverted to Government ownership. It was probably the work of the copra working parties that encouraged the government to assist the permanent return of the contingent from Tongatapu. Copra is the principal export commodity of Tonga as well as the principal cash crop of the majority of islanders. It is understood, however, that, so far, in spite of government assistance for the return of the 'seven hundred' from Tongatapu, land on Niua Fo'ou still has not been allocated by Central Government, under the Tongan tax-allotment system for life tenancy by farmers.

The indications are that the evacuation of 1946 was ad hoc and unplanned, and that the decision to carry it out was precipitate. The apparent lack of forethought about ultimate relocation of evacuees, must have made their plight far more than it need have been and their ultimate resettlement a much longer process than necessary.

Tonga now pays serious attention to the environmental hazards by which her people are afflicted. The recent assessment of measures for disaster mitigation has recommended coordinated and integrated preparedness measures, attention being drawn to the significant aspect of contingency planning for the evacuation of populated active and dormant volcanic islands. Preparedness planning will indicate the need for policy decisions concerning temporary or permanent relocation of communities in a current context of development planning, which recognises the need to reverse or to arrest the spontaneous movement of people from outer islands to urban centres. Infrastructural and administrative development of Niua Fo'ou is planned to provide an airstrip by 1980 and a six bed in-patient ward for the dispensary. The absence of secondary schooling, commented upon in the Third Development Plan, is a significant cause of migration to larger islands. Additional services such as these will reinforce the island's resources in the event of major disaster, but policy decisions for the island concerning local and national disaster preparedness, serving to coordinate and generate infrastructural development, may do more to remove psychological

resistance to living on an extremely remote and hazardous active volcanic island.

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[1]Lewis, J., *Mitigation and Preparedness for Natural Disaster in the Kingdom of Tonga* (Ministry of Overseas Development, London 1978).

[1]Rutherford, N. (Ed) *Friendly Islands: A History of Tonga* (Oxford University Press, Melbourne 1977).



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

Dates refer to areas affected by eruption

Policy Articulation of Local Autonomy in Filipino Municipal Reform, 1946–1960

A. B. VILLANUEVA*

Introduction

When Lindblom published his brilliant essay on policy-making, he was cautious to point out that 'making policy is at best a very rough process.'[1] Although the title of his piece was 'the science of muddling through', it is now evident that policy-making is more perhaps of an art and a process than a science. For Lindblom admits that 'neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated errors in predicting the consequences of policy moves.'[2] In a later volume, he wrote that it is an endless process since 'the goals of policy-making continue to change as new experience with policy throws new lights on what is possible and desirable.'[3]

As a process Lindblom describes policy-making in simple terms as a sequence of policy moves the steps of which Jones meticulously listed.[4] Jones explained that the first step in this sequence is perception of a public problem 'for which relief is sought in such a manner that . . . those immediately concerned perceive themselves to be affected and respond accordingly.'[5] The other steps in the sequence, Jones said, are 'definition, aggregation/organization, representation, formulation, legitimation, application/administration, reaction, evaluation/appraisal and resolution/termination'[6] of the public problem so perceived. This model of the policy process which Jones has described resembles a full circle because 'the end is the beginning',[7] which Lindblom agrees when he advised policy analysts not to 'expect a policy to be a final resolution of a problem' simply because a policy decision is 'only one step, one that if successful can quickly be followed by another.'[8]

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[1]Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Public Administration Review,* 14:86 (Spring 1959).

[2]*Ibid.*

[3]Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p 71.

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]Charles O. Jones, *An Introduction To The Study of Public Policy* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc, 1970), p 20.

[6]*Ibid,* p 11.

[7]*Ibid,* pp 135–148.

[8]Lindblom and Braybrooke, *op cit,* p 86.

For our present purpose we shall simplify the Jones model by dividing the policy cycle into five phases. Phase One will be called the *articulation phase* which includes perception, definition, aggregation and representation of the problem by organized groups and political parties. Phase Two will be the *formulation phase* which includes policy proposals designed by the executive or legislative branches to solve the problem. Phase Three will be the *legitimation phase* which includes legislative and executive approval of the policy proposals. Phase Four will be the *administrative phase* which includes implementation and execution of approved policies by the bureaucracy. Phase Five will be the *evaluation phase* which will include reactions, appraisals, assessments, reviews and criticisms of policy impacts by administrators in the light of feedbacks from clientele groups, political parties, organized interest groups and others who are affected by the execution of the policy. If policy changes are needed, as administrative experience shows, proposals for policy changes will be recycled to Phase One and run through the gamut of reformulation, if the need for it is warranted, or terminated if it is judged to have outlived its usefulness.

In this article, we are concerned only with Phase One – the articulation phase – by describing, analyzing and explaining what articulators in the Philippine policy process 'choose to do or not to do'[1], to use Dye's words, about the problem of local autonomy from the birth of the Philippine Republic in 1946 till the dawn of the sixties.

The Reform Articulators

During the height of the campaign of the League of Provincial Governors and City Mayors for the passage of the Local Autonomy Law in 1959, the late Don Sergio Osmena, Sr, second to the last President of the Philippine Commonwealth, issued a press statement reminding the public that one of the 'cardinal principles' of his administration was the granting of more powers to local officials.[2] But the progress toward self-government during his time was practically nil, since he did not stay in Malacanang (the Philippine White House) long enough to implement it. It was not until Roxas came into power that an attempt to institute local reform was tried through the establishment of a Local Government Reform Commission and the appointment of Filipino members to the Joint Philippine-American Financial Commission in 1946.[3] Yet the reports of these two commissions were never given congressional implementation despite Roxas' belief that the proposed reforms suggested would 'accelerate' the so-called rehabilitation of the country from the ravages of World War II.[4]

Quite different from Roxas' policy was that of President Quirino who, because of Huk brutalities, typhoons, floods and other calamities, created the Presidential

[1]Thomas R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972).

[2]The Manila *Times,* April 5, 1958, p 5.

[3]Emiliano P. Cortez, *Provincial and Municipal Law in the Philippines* (Manila: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 1952, Appendix K. See also *Truman Papers Official File No.* 1055-D. Harry S. Truman Library and Institute of Public Affairs at Independence, Missouri.

[4]Manuel A. Roxas, *Message on the State of the Nation to the First Congress in Joint Session.* January 26, 1948, p 46.

Action Committee on Social Amelioration (PACSA). This body was 'charged . . . with the duty to go to the field and minister to the needy, the hungry, and the sick. . . .'[1] It was also directed to bring 'every facility of the government to the service of the rural districts'[2] especially in the areas of Huk violence. If anything, Quirino's policy was a welfare policy, a social justice program similar to that of President Quezon, and a community development program parallel to that of President Magsaysay.

Magsaysay's policy of autonomy, on the other hand, is basically oriented to the barrio (rural villages), fundamentally directed towards popularly chosen city officials, and generally in favour of greater local fiscal powers in the form of taxation except the power to issue bonds.[3] But Congress misunderstood the latter when it amended the charter of Quezon City to allow that local government to issue bonds amounting to one million pesos to purchase school sites and playgrounds. And so it was vetoed by Magsaysay because it would create inflation; it would slow down the pace of economic development; it would increase the public debt; and it would divert government funds from urgent development purposes.[4]

The power of local officials to appoint the employees of their local governments was, at the outset, not within the scope of Magsaysay's idea of autonomy. And so he vetoed an amendment to the charter of Baguio empowering the City Mayor to appoint employees of the city government because he believed that that would deprive him of the power to appoint city department heads and take away the power of the school authorities to appoint teachers.[5] But he conceded to grant this power later when pressured by the League of Provincial Governors and City Mayors in 1957 – the year when he was preparing to run for a second term. He even went further in the same year to remind Congress, in what turned out to be his last message to that body, 'to give greater stress to local autonomy,'[6] although it was not quite clear what form, nature, degree or shape he thought it should take.

Many observers speculated that the persistence of Magsaysay in asking Congress to pass appropriate measures increasing local responsibilities would not be equalled by his successors. Political analysts believed that the 'old mosquitoes,' upon whose hands the task of implementing his policy fell, would only pay lip service to it. Because most of them are conservative in thought and action, the observation was made that even though they might swear to follow the Magsaysay line, they would do so only to honour his memory.

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[1] Elpidio Quirino, 'State-of-the-Nation Message, January 24, 1949,' *Official Gazette,* 45:155 (1949).

[2] 'The Social Amelioration Program,' *Quirino, The Leader – The Statesman at 58,* November 16, 1948.

[3] *House Congressional Record,* 3:8, January 23, 1956.

[4] *Senate Congressional Record,* 3:699, April 3, 1956.

[5] *Senate Congressional Record,* 3:47, June 25, 1956.

[6] The Manila *Times,* January 30, 1957, p 11. See also Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography* (Manila: La Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971).

However, political developments that took place during the post-Magsaysay era show that the policy of local autonomy was not set aside. On the contrary, it was continued by President Garcia who, in one of his messages to Congress, gave positive endorsement to it. He went even further to broaden the scope of self-government, defined it into a more meaningful term, and indicated the lines along which Congress might try to follow for the purpose of legitimizing it.

Garcia's policy, however, was essentially similar to that of his predecessor. Although he, like Magsaysay, touched upon the subject of local borrowing as an improper method of financing local functions, he stressed that 'local governments should assume greater responsibility in supporting and financing their local affairs if they wish to exercise greater authority in the management thereof.'[1] More than that he suggested that, instead of a Department of Interior which Magsaysay believed to be the appropriate agency to take care of local reform.[2] Congress should create a local government commission 'to study [improvements] in the administration of provincial and municipal governments and to recommend appropriate measures to carry them out. . . .'[3] Finally, he called the attention of Congress to the fact that 'present laws regulating the relations between the national . . . and local governments are no longer realistic, nor are they in keeping with the needs of the times.'[4] Accordingly, he recommended that 'remedial measures should be passed to improve this situation and reduce local dependence upon the national government for almost everything they need.'[5]

If we may look at the other side of the political picture, we find that local autonomy has become a lively issue supported by contenders for the presidency and senate in 1961. The titular head of the Liberal Party, Vice President Diosdado Macapagal, who, when serving a term in Congress, was an articulate critic of Magsaysay, and who as one of the aspirants to the presidency, made known his stand in favour of localism. In a speech before a conference of Municipal Mayors at the Lyceum of the Philippines in 1959, the Vice President (who later was elected President to succeed Garcia) stated: 'If we are true Nationalists, we should immediately abandon this colonial system by transferring the sovereign power of the people from the national government to the local officials who are closest to the people.'[6] For he believed that tremendous power placed in the hands of one official is 'repugnant to the municipalities and to the dignity of the inhabitants.'[7] Aside from that he went on to explain that 'this concentration of power in one man is a vestige of colonialism imposed upon us by the American and Spanish governments who believed that sovereignty should rest in the mother country.'[8] In an earlier speech he pointed to 'over-

[1] 'Message of the President of the Philippines,' *House Congressional Record*, 2:14, January 26, 1959.
[2] The Manila *Times*, January 30, 1957, p 11.
[3] *Loc cit.*
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] The Manila *Times*, April 8, 1959, pp 1-A, 12-A.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*

centralization of authority in Malacanang' as virtually exposing the Chief Executive 'to all kinds of blame even for the most flimsy failing of a bureau head.'[1]

The Progressive Party's presidential candidate in 1957, Manuel P. Manahan, who, in the senatorial elections of 1959, was one of the six standard bearers of the Grand Alliance, likewise approved the move for greater local self-government. He advocated governmental decentralization, called for the end of centralism and the 'rule of men, party machines and bosses,'[2] and favoured 'barrio home-rule' as a means of liberating the plain barrio folks from 'the tyranny of power and presidential abuses.'[3] He believed that the latter is 'a reasonable and feasible solution to . . . rural problems . . . and a step towards [the development of] the barrios.'[4] He also believed that there is a type of leadership in these communities which will bring about genuine self-government because it is 'forceful and idealistic.'[5] But even so he did not want that these folks should be left alone to chart their own ways to better living. 'What is needed,' he declared, 'is for someone to go there and organize them and lead them and work for them to help them improve their lot.'[6]

Manahan's views were shared by the organizers of the Grand Alliance – Padilla, De la Rosa, Rodrigo, Manglapus, Pelaez, Pimentel, Jr, Mondonedo and Vargas – who incorporated them in an impressive platform as one of its planks. One part of this plank reads: 'We believe in decentralizing the powers of government in order to give our people a greater and more direct participation in government. Government that is too centralized is undemocratic and is a vestige of colonialism. Sovereignty, in a democracy, resides in the people and the people must be given greater participation in the exercise of their sovereign powers. A Government which is too centralized is unstable. It is like an inverted pyramid. Such government is unresponsive to local needs. We therefore believe in giving more autonomy to local governments down to barrio level in the solution of their problems and in their effort to provide themselves with their essential needs.'[7]

Another part reads: 'We are against too much power in the hands of any single official, like the President of the Philippines who relatively is more powerful than the President of any democratic country in the world. This is undemocratic because this power can be used and is being used to frustrate even the sovereign

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[1] Quoted from the column of T. D. Valencia, 'Over A Cup of Coffee,' The Manila *Times*, May 22, 1959, p 4.

[2] The Manila *Times*, October 19, 1958, p 5.

[3] The Sunday *Times*, September 7, 1958, p 11.

[4] 'The Issues As The Parties Look At Them,' *The Sunday Times Magazine*, October 4, 1959, pp 10–11.

[5] The Manila *Times*, November 19, 1958, p 5.

[6] Quoted from the column of I. P. Soliongco, 'Seriously Speaking,' *The Sunday Chronicle*, November 15, 1959, p 4.

[7] Plank No 12 of the platform of the 'Dakilange Katipunan,' The Philippines *Free Press*, September 12, 1959, p 35.

will of the people. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. We are for curtailing and distributing the power of the President.'[1]

While top policy makers approved local autonomy proposals, Congress delayed action in a long and bitter debate. But it finally translated these proposals into national law by passing the Barrio Charter, Local Autonomy Act, and the General City Law. What is more, it liberalized Dillon's rule of strict interpretation of local powers to read: 'Implied power of a province, city or municipality shall be . . . construed in its favour. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favour of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.'[2] Similarly, it stressed that the 'general welfare clause' of the Local Autonomy Act 'shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare and material progress of the people in the community.'[3]

Strategies of Reform

Notwithstanding all these developments in favour of self-government, the question of how to approach the whole problem of municipal reform was raised. Is legislation the proper way to establish it? If so, should it be a step-by-step process of giving local powers? Should it be done in a single stroke? Should it be based on a knowledge of what actually are the needs of local communities? Should it be carried on by a team of experts staffing a reform commission which will disband itself after the task is done or transform itself into a municipal research bureau organized like those of American State Leagues of Municipalities? If not, what ought to be the alternative? Should it be an amendment to the Philippine Constitution providing for home-rule? Or should it be a revival of the *barangay* (community) spirit of *bayanihan* (cooperation) through the process of community development directed by the President himself?

A great deal of thinking has been devoted to the questions posed above and the answers may be divided into three general categories, namely: (1) the legislative strategy, (2) the constitutional strategy, and (3) the community development strategy. Their nature, scope and limits will be the subject of our explanation in the remainder of this article.

The Legislative Strategy

Supporters of this strategy generally agree that any form of local autonomy will have to be granted by Congress through a series of legislative acts. But they are divided on the question of what type of legislation will have to be passed to establish strong local governments.

One point of view is that if local autonomy is to be granted, it should be the result of a systematic codification of all laws, executive orders and judicial

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Republic Act No 2264, Approved June 1959, Sec 12(1). Hereinafter cited as *The Local Autonomy* Act.

[3] The Local Autonomy Act, Sec 12(2).

decisions relating to local governments. It was believed that this would be more appropriate than the practice of enacting piecemeal measures even though they tend to increase local powers. It was argued that local autonomy is not something that can be accomplished by merely approving proposals on the spur of the moment, but it is one that ought to be the product of an exhaustive, comprehensive and integrated research – a task which could be done competently by a Local Government Reform Commission which, after completion of its work, should constitute itself as a reference or research bureau dedicated to more studies on local problems. Supreme Court decisions which, in effect, constitute 'judicial legislations' have been cited as one area where serious research can be done and such decisions codified and systemized into a body of laws. For it was noted that many of the recent decisions concerning national-local relationships have been confusing precisely because of conflicting provisions of law, orders and rulings from the President's office, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. And so the task of the commission should be to bring all these doctrines together into a system of laws which Congress should pass as a local government code.[1]

Furthermore, sound reform, argued the advocates of this plan, must be based on a thorough 'knowledge . . . of the forces at work in local communities.'[2] If autonomy is to be real, genuine, and meaningful there must be an intelligent study of the relationships between political realities and theoretical ideas. It was further argued that although it is clear that local officials are as capable as national technicians in performing governmental functions, and that the present system of intergovernmental relations is defective, many problems have yet to be solved. For example, the correlation between economic development, which the government had declared as the ultimate goal, and local autonomy is a case in point. It was contended that very little is known about the effects of one over the other and that it is doubtful if local autonomy would promote economic development because the latter is a leap into the unknown which requires central planning to bring about maximum results. 'The lessons of other democracies,' two staff members of the Institute of Public Administration reflected, "should make us ponder more. Elsewhere, the trend is toward the transfer of progressively greater powers to the central government at the expense of local units. It seems that the exigencies of the welfare or 'warfare' state so dictate."[3]

These observations were ruled out by the more persistent apologists of local self-rule. They believed that there is "no need to incorporate [Supreme Court] decisions" into a code because they already have made it clear 'that the authority of the chief executive over local governments is supervisory'[4] only. Nor should the

[1]*House Congressional Record,* 2:1141–1153, March 9, 1959.

[2]Quotation is from Professor Carlos P. Ramos, Director of the Institute of Public Administration. Cited by J. L. Mercado, "The New 'Home Rule' Battle," Philippines *Free Press,* January 3, 1959, p 19.

[3]Jose V. Abueva and Leonardo C. Mariano, 'More Powers to Local Officials?', *The Sunday Times Magazine,* March 3, 1957, p 7.

[4]*House Congressional Record,* 2:1148, March 9, 1959.

local autonomy movement slow down its pace to wait for the studies of scholars, the recommendations of a reform commission, and the proposals of a research bureau. For the truth is, the contention ran, that local autonomy cannot be accomplished 'in one single legislation' whether that be a general or special law 'but it must be a continuous process of doling our powers to local governments,' until the point of perfection shall have been reached.[1] There is no need to wait even for a brief moment because experience has shown that delay will only bring about no results at all. The case of the Local Government Commission on Reform appointed by the late President Roxas in 1947 was pointed out as an example of proposals which were never acted upon. Finally, it was strongly argued that public discussion on the subject of local self-government has been going on for many, many years and yet nothing has been accomplished. As Congressman Osmena,Jr, flippantly put it, 'every year we have been talking of giving more autonomy to local governments but we end simply by talking. I believe it is about time that we translate these talks into action.'[2]

Although there were marked diversity of views among those who favoured local autonomy by legislation, there was a consensus of opinion that any grant of powers to the local units would not be complete and unlimited. As the Chairman of the Committee on Provincial and Municipal Government in the House of Representatives, Congressman Macias, and his successor to that committee, Congressman Honrado, pointed out, Congress will not 'give a complete grant. . .'[3] and that such grant will have to be exercised only within the bounds set by the lawmaking body.

The Constitutional Strategy

Some local government consultants, however, believe that no matter what forms of autonomy Congress decides to grant, how sincere the members of the legislative branch are, how systematic self-government measures will be, and how liberal the new theory of interpreting a local power is – the legislative approach to reform will not bring about a 'millenium' to local units. Nor will it lead to the establishment of genuine 'home-rule' at all. It will not protect local governments from unnecessary meddling of congressional leaders as, for example, in matters of local government reorganization. It will not guarantee that local citizens will soon have the opportunity to decide what structure their local government should take and what kind of charter to adopt. All these will never come about, they argue, unless national leaders approach local autonomy from the constitutional standpoint. It was not suggested, however, that 'home-rule' should be granted in absolute terms but that it should be extended in a moderate amount, although the former deserves to be given thoughtful consideration and should not be ruled out.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p 1149.
[2] *House Congressional Record*, 2:1165, March 12, 1959.
[3] *Ibid.*, p 1257.
[4] Clarence C. Ludwig, *Observations On Various Phases of Local Governments and Local Autonomy in the Philippines* (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, 1956), pp 64–66. Unpublished.

A group of Filipino reformers who accept constitutional home rule in general espouse a different point of view. They do not mean local decisions in city organization and charter making. But they mean 'decentralization of powers.'[1] Yet they do not make it clear just how it is to be defined. For example, do they refer to a specific delegation of certain governmental powers to the local governments? It may be observed that constitutional home-rule is a broad concept. To this end, it is suggested that revisers of the constitution should look to the experience of home-rule states in America not necessarily to copy what they have done or are doing but that they should profit from their successes, avoid their mistakes, and adapt what is transferrable to the country. As a specific suggestion, reformers should give due consideration to the possible use of the institutions of direct democracy – initiative, referendum and recall – by the local citizens in charter-making, local borrowing, and changing local governmental structures.

The Community Development Strategy

The third strategy suggested to achieve local autonomy in municipal reform is the community development process. According to its proponents, 'community independence and responsibility . . . local leadership, initiative and autonomy'[2] can be developed only if the local people live a happy and contented life. It aims to foster 'a desire among the people to make changes'[3] in their paternalistic habits by teaching them how to help themselves 'rather than imposing on them the changes to be made.'[4] But such changes would have to be directed by 'persons of newer scientific knowledge and technical skill.'[5]

It was assumed that a local citizen can discuss community affairs more intelligently only if his stomach is full. He can talk of politics only if he has clothes to cover his body. He can value the significance of self-rule 'religiously' only if he has 'a little more roof over his head.'[6] And so, as Manahan was quoted to have said, someone should lead them to a new life.[7] They can do this only by 'introducing common sense techniques of community improvements, arousing civic spirit, encouraging growth and

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[1] Philippines *Free Press,* February 12, 1960, p 69 and The Manila *Times,* February 9, 1960, p 5-A. Proponents of this type of home-rule would have us to believe that it will relax 'Malacanang control over the barrio governments,' accelerate economic development, enhance the maturing of Filipino political institutions, stimulate citizen participation in government, discourage tax evasion, and make local autonomy inviolate. The Manila *Times,* April 22, 1959, p 22-A; February 9, 1960, p 5-A: Philippines *Free Press,* February 12, 1960, p 69.

[2] 'Message of President Magsaysay' (accompanying the Budget of the Philippnes Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958) in *Senate Congressional Record,* 4:176, February 12, 1957.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Hardy Wickwar, 'Local Authorities and Community Development,' *IULA Quarterly,* 11:84–87 (1959).

[6] Quotation is from President Magsaysay which was cited by the Dakilang Katipunan in Plank No 4 of their 1959 election platform. See Philippines *Free Press,* September 12, 1959, p 34.

[7] Soliongco, *supra.*

diversification of cottage industries and, above all, promoting active participation of village citizens in self-government.'[1] It is important, the argument ran, that local citizens, especially those in the barrios, should know how to practice these things because, as a justice of the peace was heard to have declared, they are the 'redeemers' of the country.[2] What is even more important, in terms of economic development in general and industrialization in particular, is that the local communities can develop purchasing power to buy some of the 'beers', 'coca-colas', and other products from the factories. Although this sounds utopian because it is hard to see the dollar produced by these communities, an independent observer believed that they can 'create the atmosphere wherein it will be easy for industry to grow and produce dollars.'[3] They will also 'see the necessity' of producing more products for export.'[4] And when they learn how to do all these things, the 'local missionaries' such as the community development workers and so forth 'will quietly move away from the scene' because they 'cannot be on the job forever.'[5]

It has been contended, however, that the community development approach to local autonomy is not appropriate at all.[6] On the contrary, the contention has been made that it is paternalistic, centralistic and unrealistic simply because it involves the employment of national civil servants who go to the barrios and perform a 'messianic' task of teaching the folks the A, B, C's of local autonomy. Actually, it was further contended, what is being taught is not self-reliance but dependence upon outside help. Barrio citizens will continue their habits of looking at the national government as a provider of services; they become suppliants for some of the necessities which they themselves can provide; they lose their initiative and civic consciousness. The community development workers of the national government may not be 'empire builders', so they said, but their presence in the barrios limit the development of a local government that does not need central guidance in matters purely local in nature; it diminishes local autonomy because it is an instrument used by the central government to supervise local bodies. For, in fact, the presence of technicians sent from Manila to these rural communities creates the atmosphere of central direction, 'of hierarchy', 'of a flowering bureaucracy', 'of upper governmental levels being bosses over lower ones', 'of government from the top down.' This type of approach, opponents concluded, is dangerous to the evolution of institutions of local autonomy.

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[1] Editorial, The Manila *Times*, May 12, 1959, p 4-A; Ramon P. Binamira, 'Lettor To The Editor,' *The Sunday Times Magazine*, October 25, 1959, p 3.

[2] Quoted by Napoleon G. Rama, 'Barrio Folks At The Polls,' Philippines *Free Press*, January 16, 1060, p 37.

[3] F. Sionil Jose, 'The Barrio and The Ballot,' *The Sunday Times Magazine*, February 21, 1960, p 12.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p 15.

[6] Alejandro S. Hufana, 'The Barrio and The Government,' *Progress*, 1959, p 200; Ludwig, *et passim*, p 54; The Manila *Times*, January 2, 1960, p 4-A; The Manila *Bulletin*, April 28, 1960, p 37.

Community development has been criticized as philosophically unsound. It has been said that to send, 'technical backstoppers' to the local communities who will teach the people how to fill their stomachs in order to be awake to listen to a lecture on how to reconcile conflicting interests through the democratic process is impractical.[1] Common sense is reason enough to illustrate that this is so, the critics said, because 'no country on earth could afford to fill people's stomachs. Moreover, to fill a . . . man's stomach is to make a slave out of him!'[2]

Yet the attitudes of the local people, especially the barrio man, would seem to justify attempts of prodding him into action. His mind, his soul, and his heart are practically numb. Life in his village is virtually dead. He has a fatalistic philosophy of life. He does not care what goes on around him except of course when his house and those of his neighbours burn. When illness comes he goes to a 'quack doctor.' These are the hard facts of living in the barrio which defenders of the community development process rejoined and even philospher-critics admitted.[3] To change these attitudes of the barrio man, therefore, it is argued that community development workers must go to the barrios. They must open their eyes to the new opportunities Congress have passed in the form of municipal policies designed to give them the opportunity to 'come to their own,'[4] if we may borrow Huk Supremo Luis Taruc's own words when he dedicated his autobiography to the barrio people. But the community development workers should not stay there the rest of their lives.

Conclusion

There are obvious limitations to the use of western-oriented policy frameworks in studying non-western public policy-making. For example, in western political systems interest groups and political parties are said to be one of the major articulators of policy. In Third World nations, according to Smith,[5] this may not necessarily be so in view of the absence of these political institutions as a result of governmental suppression in some of the developing countries. And even if they exist at all they may be weakly organized at best or abysmally inarticulate at worst.[6]

An astute student of Philippine politics observed that Filipino culture has allowed the growth of 'modern associational types of interest groups',[7] a good example of which is the League of Provincial Governors and City Mayors. However, another student of Filipino political behaviour has written that Philippine organized groups are not as influential as their counterparts in the

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[1] Jeremias U. Montemayro, 'How Can We Help The Barrio Man?', *The Sunday Times Magazine*, August 28, 1960, p 10.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* See also E. P. Petanne, 'The Impact of Industrialization on Traditional Filipino Society,' *Progress*, 1959, pp 20–23.

[4] Luis Taruc, *Born of the People* (New York: International Publishers, 1953), p 11.

[5] Thomas B. Smith, 'The Study of Policy-making in Developing Nations,' *Policy Studies Journal*, 1:245 (Summer 1973).

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p 234.

west: they seem to have 'relatively slight interest in the achievement of categorical goals, such as general legislation. . . .'[1] Two major political parties exist also but both are undisciplined, a characteristic which has great implications for the public policy-making process: 'The administration's policy becomes the personal policy of the incumbent president rather than that of his party.'[2] Thus, the local autonomy policies of Osmena, Sr, Magsaysay and Garcia, who were titular heads of the Nacionalista Party, were their own personal policies and not the Nacionalista Party.

The substance of all the policies of and strategies to local autonomy – be they articulated by Presidents or Presidents-to-be- is the strengthening of democratic institutions at the grassroots. In more specific terms, this includes upgrading barrio life, teaching barrio citizens lessons in the democratic political process. To bring these objectives about, articulators of local autonomy felt that the only way is through municipal reform, the formulation of which was left to the executive and legislative branches of the Philippine government.

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[1]Carl H. Lande, *Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics.* Monograph Series No 6, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1965, p 2.
[2]*Ibid,* p 3..

Quarterly Notes

UNITED NATIONS - Meeting of public administration experts: UNESCO

The UNESCO Report of the experts meeting on the adaptation of Public Administration on and management in different socio-cultural contexts, contains eight papers presented at Tangier, Morocco at the end of September 1977.

Understandably, since it has already been published in full elsewhere, Bernard Schaffer's paper on 'Improvement of Access to Public Services, appears as a summary article only. Nontheless it is a pity that the full version of what must have been a Key paper is not embodied in the report. For the average citizen will see scant benefit from administrative reforms unless and until the indifference, incompetence or arrogance so often, alas, met in government offices, has been eradicated.

CAFRAD reports on the very low achievement in Africa coming from the programmes for integrating rural and urban traditional and modern sectors.

Professor Timsit's and the IIAS paper draw attention to the persistence of 'administrative mimicry' which inhibits the development of administrative machinery truly relevant to the individual social and cultural patterns of African countries.

This report contains plenty of meat, relieved by the summaries provided for each paper.

(specially contributed)

AUSTRALIA - Lessons from Local Government in Developing Countries

At 2 per square km Australia has one of the lowest densities of any country in the world. In spite of this, its inhabitants are, in effect, all urban dwellers. They share the same services, live in the same type of houses, travel in the same vehicles and have the same standards of living whether they live in one of the capital cities, or hundreds of miles from the nearest big town.

Secondly, Australia is experiencing something of an urban exodus, as rising levels of real income and technology have combined to enable the realisaion of dreams which have their origin deep in the rural mysticism of the Anglo-Saxons.

These two facts blind Australians to the central fact of life in the developing world – cities are powerful magnets drawing people from a countryside which repels them by its lack of opportunity.

Whether pull or push is greater is for the theoreticians or semanticists to argue. It is for Local government to get on with the job of tackling the day-to-day manifestations of the problem.

City v Country

Even in the most developed countries, rural local governments present a distinctly different picture from those of urban areas, notwithstanding their common origins and legislative bases. Any student learns that before he can characterise the system he must first disect it into its two basic elements – city and country.

In developing countries this distinction is not merely an aid to study, it is a fundamental of life. Indeed, one commentor[1] has said:

'The basic conflict in the Third World is not between capital and labour, but between capital and countryside, farmer and townsman, villager and the urban proletarian elite, gainers from dear food and gainers from cheap food.'

Urban Local Government

The challenge faced by urban local government is how to provide the services necessary to enable the rapidly increasing inhabitants of high density cities to survive, for clearly they can not stem the tide.[2]

The solution lies in a combination of technology and social engineering.

The technological requirements are for the development of new methods of housing construction, packaged services, such as water and sewerage, and efficient, equitable methods of taxation to fund these and other innovations.

On the social side, local government has to learn how to recreate communities from disconnected, disorientated industrial proletariat. It has to show them how to restructure the social linkages that enabled the village to survive in a hostile environment. Where the elders of the tribe once took the young men out to show them how to hunt, the city must show them how to get jobs. Surrogating for the village midwife, the city must show the isolated mothers of the industrial proletariat how to cope with their young.

Country Challenges

Rural areas lack three ingredients that draw people to the city. They are jobs, education and health services.

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[1]M. Lipton, *Why People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development.*(Maurice Temple Smith London, 1977).

[2]B. Ward and R. Dubois, *Only One Earth* (Pelican, 1972).

Making these available is, therefore, the challenge facing rural local authorities.

In spite of the daunting task, and their restricted physical resources, they have an important attribute of local government going for them. This is that effective local government can mobilise volunteers in a way not open to other levels of government.

While the city's structure is based on a belief that the community's interests are best promoted by competition, urban local governments preserve the vestigial remains of another philosophy – co-operation.

Co-operation is probably at least as difficult to achieve as competition. It has its own philosophy, and technology both of which the rural leader must absorb and practice before he seeks their implementation.

Local Government and National Policy

One thing that attracted the early philosophers to the noble savage was his sturdy independence.

At the organisational level this is something that local government can preserve and build.

If it becomes a credible focus for local aspirations, it can act as a counter-balance to the over-weening power of central governments with their tendency, especially in developing countries, towards totalitarianism.

Indeed, if we accept Lipton's diagnosis of the real inhibitor to growth being the dominance of city based interests, strong, decentralised local government is a prerequisite to development.

Maybe, then, developing countries will reform their government structures from having centralised power reluctantly reticulated downwards in diminishing amounts, to federations of autonomous local communities that cede restricted power upwards, but only to the extent necessary to achieve wider goals.

(contributed by LEO HAWKINS)

Book Reviews

Social Accounting for Development Planning – with special reference to Sri Lanka, GRAHAM PYATT and ALAN ROE with JEFFREY ROUND and ROBERT LINDLEY, and based on work undertaken in association with: J. A. C. BROWN, PETER DAVIES, NEIL KARUNARATNE, ROBERT MABRO and S. NARAPALSINGHAM: foreword by RICHARD STONE; *Cambridge University Press* 1977; Tables and appendices; pp 190; £9.00.

According to the title page, this book is 'a Study prepared for the International Labour Office within the framework of the World Employment Programme' by a group of four authors and five associates.

It opens, after the customary acknowledgements, with a fourteen page foreword by Professor Richard Stone which no reader or user of the book should skip. It is a masterly concentrated yet eminently readable 'mini text-book' of the art of analysing national economic accounting systems. A three page history of the development of economic data systems is followed by two pages on present UN practice and a concise essay on the design of integrated systems of economic, social and demographic statistics for different types of analyses. The foreword concludes with an epilogue recommending 'the data base described in this book' as 'well suited to the kind of structural analysis for which it was designed.'

Professor Stone may be right in suggesting that 'we should await the outcome of the second, analytical phase of the authors' work since this will give us some indication of the output that can be obtained from the input described in this book', but this reviewer feels he can be more positive than that: he has found a great deal of 'fodder for thought' in the present volume. There is, for instance, the excellent brief history of post-war Sri Lanka in Chapter 2, illustrated by the comparison of Sri Lanka's development statistics with those of other Asian countries. It highlights not only Sri Lanka's uniqueness but also experiences that seem to be common to many of the poorer of the new nations, such as the sequential relationships between social progress, social expectations, economic difficulties and political unrest, or the effects of enlightened welfare policies in health, education and nutrition on population growth, urbanisation, unemployment and foreign exchange. The discussion of such relationships should not be mis-read as anti-welfare state propaganda, but rather in the authors' own words (page 38) as an attempt at 'easing the task of analysis of policy choices which is so clearly necessary.'

Chapter 3 introduces the statistical information system which the authors have compiled for Sri Lanka and Chapter 4 uses this system for the design of a social accounting matrix which serves the study of some important features of the Sri Lanka economy, such as income distribution and employment.

This reviewer applauds the authors' assertion (page 67) that 'inadequacy of primary information' should not be accepted as an excuse for not attempting this kind of analysis. He contends that it should be made the reason for the periodic repetition of the exercise on the basis of the information that has accumulated in the interval. On the other hand, he deplores the authors' acceptance and use of the cliché of 'the fundamental dichotomy' between the urban and rural sectors of the developing countries (page 56) and hopes that they will, one day, devote some time to the measurement of the largely non-monetary incomes of rural societies. Similarly, he expects that the deeper study of traditional family and household organisation in Asian countries will convince the authors that data collection on the basis of households rather than individuals, far from 'impeding meaningful analysis' (page 57), is essential for the assessment of the economies of the vast non-westernised majorities of these countries.

Chapter 5 contains an analysis of household consumption and expenditure patterns. The tables and graphs in pages 90–95 (e.g. Figures 5.2 to 5.6) are good examples of the kind of information that the social and economic and, not to forget, the physical planner expects from statistical analysis. The same holds good for Chapter 6, which demonstrates the value of the authors' SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) approach for decisions on fiscal policy, resource allocation or protection of particular sectors of the economy. The example of the use of the SAM method for project analysis (page 114) deserves special mention. It may well become a common feature of feasibility studies.

Three general questions remain to be answered with regard to the book under review:

1 Is it of use for the decision makers of Sri Lanka?

2 Is it worth while publishing a study (in book form) that forms only a part of an on-going larger project of research?

3 Are the authors justified in calling their book '*Social* Accounting for Development Planning?'

The first two of these questions can be answered with an unequivocal YES. The answer to the third is by no means equally clear.

Every senior civil servant, head of a corporation or manager of a statutory authority should have a copy of this book on his shelf and use it in calling for information from his statistical section. Politicians should have copies marked, flagged and annotated by their advisers, in order to remind themselves that there are instances when the economic consequences of political decisions can be foretold with some degree of accuracy.

The works on the present study began with an ILO mission to Sri Lanka in 1973 and took four years to reach its present stage. The promised second part (see Foreword, pages xxvii and xxxi) may well require another two years or more. Decisions of economic policy cannot wait for progress in research. The authors are convinced that the methods which they have developed are useful for such decisions. They are therefore justified in publishing what they have – even at the risk of having to publish a revised or refined version in a few years time. It is a minor question whether the publishers would have been wiser to choose a slightly less durable and less expensive form of printing and binding.

The authors apply their SAM method to economic questions, such as income distribution, input-output, household expenditure, fiscal policy and resource allocation. Future work is to cover subjects such as the structure of protection, the impact of tax systems and the supply and demand for different kinds of labour. The measurement of social change is not mentioned, nor is there a reference to the many publications on quantitative indicators of social development that have appeared over the past ten years. It seems a pity that a study which claims to deal with *Social* accounting for development planning and was prepared for the ILO in Geneva makes no mention of a next-door neighbour and fellow UN research centre, the United Nations Research Institute in Social Development.

O. H. KOENIGSBERGER

Urbanisation and Social Change in West Africa, J. GUGLER and W. G. FLANAGAN; *Cambridge University Press,* 1978; pp 235; £10.00 hardback; £3.95 paperback.

'Urbanisation and Social Change in West Africa' is part of a series of publications focused on urbanisation in developing countries edited by Kenneth Little.

'Urbanisation in the Middle East' has already been published and now comes 'Urbanisation and Social Change in West Africa', and it is understood that there are further titles in active preparation.

As the authors state in their preface, this book is the outcome of an analysis of the considerable literature available on urbanisation in West Africa. With enthusiasm and perception the authors have moved from the confines of sociology and social anthropology and have, in their own words, 'drawn heavily on work conventionally labelled political science, economics, demography, geography, history and psychology. Not surprisingly we found some of the most penetrating observations in the writings of West African novelists and playwrights who have given vigorous expression to the experiences of people living in a period of rapid change'. Given that there is a very considerable amount of literature on the subject of urbanisation a prodigious task faced the authors in giving shape and form to the results of their research. Happily the authors, after a brief Introduction 'Exploding Cities in Poverty-stricken Countries', adopt a historical approach to the phenomena of urbanisation in West Africa. The result is a continuous narrative flow from the first significant chapter on 'Empires and

Trade' through 'Urbanisation and Economic Development' to the now commonplace 'Rural-urban Migration'.

Analysis then centres on a review of families and social institutions in the process of change.

Whilst there is a uniform quality in the writing on all the issues raised, a special mention must be made of Chapter 7 'The Family: Continuity and Change' and Chapter 8 'Changes in the Position of Women'. The available evidence is presented with notable economy and the conclusions drawn by the authors are stated with commendable clarity.

Given the pace and readability of preceding chapters the Conclusion 'The Incorporation of the West African Peasantry' is a disappointment. Perhaps this is due to the fact that West Africa covers an area of 6.1 million square miles, has a population of more than 140 million and is about four times the geographical size of the European Economic Community. All this information is contained in the valuable notes on the text which comprise a separate chapter. Is it surprising that the diverse community and clans, tribes and nations that make up West Africa elude a neat prognosis of future development?

As well as the valuable notes on the text there is an impressive bibliography, together with a name index and a subject index. Useful maps and tables complete the volume.

It is interesting to note from the narrative that the East Africa Centre for Social Research played an important role in influencing the direction and quality of social research. Those who supported the institution in the early days with friendship and funds will appreciate the acknowledgement.

'Urbanisation and Social Change in West Africa' is a valuable book that gives a graphic and exciting picture of social change in a part of the developing world. It is eminently readable and holds deep interest for the general reader. The authors are to be congratulated on the way they have handled their material and for their courage in stating a position and perspective. Some readers might take issue with them on matters of detail, but the broad perspective of urbanisation and its effect on individuals and social institutions is excellently recorded.

Strongly recommended reading both for those with a special interest in West Africa and its development and for students who have a general interest in the process of development.

A. R. G. PROSSER

The Geography of Tropical African Development: A study of Spatial Patterns of Economic Change Since Independence, A. M. O'CONNOR; *Pergamon Press,* 1978; pp 255; £10.00 hardback; £4.00 paperback.

We are all geographers now. People who make it their business to know about contemporary Africa need an Atlas handy, an up-to-date one. We find ourselves

asking 'where is it?', 'which are its neighbouring countries', and 'what are its natural resources' *apropos* Eritrea, Zambia's transport problems, Lesotho's dependence on South Africa, or the importance of Shaba province. Simple questions, but successively difficult hurdles that claim many victims.

Readers wanting to flex and develop their spatial faculties will welcome A. M. O'Connor's Second Edition. His focus is the period 1956–76, with major stress on economic development. The book is organised along sectoral lines, with chapters on agriculture, fishing and forestry, mining, industry, power and transport. There is also an introductory overview, chapters on urbanisation and external economic relations, and a conclusion on overall rates of growth and the emergence of economic and spatial inequalities. Each chapter contains a selective and annotated reading list. There are numerous maps and tables (many of which don't add much to the discussion) and some well-chosen plates.

In a work on economic geography written by a geographer it is natural that there should be a geographer's bias. An economist could have provided additional insights that would have made this a more complete and useful book. For instance, in the discussion on the location and growth of industry, a country's possession of natural resources is emphasised rather at the expense of markets or indigenous enterprise. The stress placed on the rate of growth of money GNP to record performance seems unsophisticated in view of what we know about the weakness of these data, and movements in absolute poverty could have been illumined by the selective use of basic needs indicators. Much of the discussion is relevant to the development of the modern sector only, while the overwhelming majority of Africans still operate in the traditional sector. Most important, a discussion of the concept of Urban Bias would have added insight to the chapters on Agriculture, Industry, and Urbanization.

Nevertheless the conclusions carry conviction, familiar though they now are. Few countries have made real progress towards self-sufficiency, even though this is a universal goal. There have been sharp reversals in the policy cycle, caused not only by the vicissitudes of world trade but also by erratic internal management. Industrial development has been patchy and superficial. Spatial and economic cleavages have appeared within countries and throughout Tropical Africa. Most important for the poor, there has been a disappointing growth of food production, which has probably not been keeping pace with the growth of population.

It is interesting to compare this book with Pierre Gourou's great classic 'The Tropical World', the first edition of which appeared a generation ago, in 1953. Gourou, who left a deep impression on a large number of colonial administrators, planters and students, as well as this reviewer, was a pessimist about tropical development. He dwelt at morbid length on the unhealthiness of the tropics, the poverty of their soil, and the danger of interfering with traditional agricultural regimes. Some of this now looks dated. 'Industrial possibilities' gets an eloquent three pages. On the other hand, what he said about problems of food supply and the nefarious effects of European intervention is still well worth

reading. Gourou's book was written very largely from the standpoint of the traditional peasant cultivator, and contains timeless insights. O'Connor's is a world apart, Africa seen from newspapers, the air, and official statistical data. We need both perspectives.

Those who doubt the progress made in Tropical Africa over this last twenty-five years should ponder Gourou's emphatic *envoi:* 'The main problem in the development of the hot, wet regions is one of health'. Africa has passed on to other problems, more pleasant to deal with. A. M. O'Connor has provided us with a geographer's perspective on these problems which all those who have to worry about the location of Kariba and the significance of the Gezira floods are recommended to keep close by them, for browsing or reference alike.

J. T. WINPENNY

African Metropolis: Nairobi's Self-help City, ANDREW HAKE; *Sussex University Press,* 1977; illustrated, maps, index; pp 284; £10.00.

Andrew Hake's book on Nairobi, one of Africa's most advanced cases of modern metropolitan development, is a rare and fascinating account or urban life, historical and contemporary, written from the standpoint and out of the experience of an active participant in urban affairs. The book, highly condensed out of what is obviously a very rich volume of material arising out of Hake's long residence in the city, deals with its origins and socio-economic and political development as a backcloth to a close examination of the residential, employment and community structures of that 'other' urban area – the 'self-help city' of those for whom the modern metropolis provides promise without security of opportunity or sponsored support. The great strength of the study lies in its ability to present a different perspective from the many excellent academic monographs which have documented specific aspects of migration, employment, low-income housing, squatting and slum communities, crime and welfare, city politics and planning – all of which are represented here – and from the multiple reports which document 'official' government policy and – often internationally sponsored – plans for the city. Hake's treatment takes us back to the reporting on the conditions of the labouring and pauper classes in nineteenth-century London, and will stand, as they do, for its time and place as a valuable historical record in its own right. Its value is enhanced in this respect by Hake's long sojourn in the city, and by his informed and committed interest in the affairs of large numbers of ordinary people and in the effect of policy and planning on their lives, seen as very much the story of their own efforts, expressed in a marvellous intricacy and idiocyncrasy of response to the circumstances which confront them. It is no mean achievement in distilling this mosaic of life-styles. Hake keeps clear sight of the larger forces at work moulding the development of Nairobi as the capital of Kenya and the point of articulation of multinational and transnational influences and tendencies. The book is a distinguished contribution to the literature as much as to the analysis of urban Africa, and

will no doubt be much alluded to in future attempts to interpret the meaning as well as to understand the determinants of contemporary urbanisation both in Africa and elsewhere.

MICHAEL SAFIER

Government in Business (revised edition 1977), S. S. KHERA; *National Publishing House, New Delhi;* pp 464 index and appendices; Rs90.00.

Shri Khera published the original edition of this work in 1963, basing it on a series of lectures given in 1959 to the Indian Institute of Public Administration; he has now extensively revised it to reflect the conditions of 1976. The list of appointments he has held, given on the title page, show how well qualified he is by experience to write about the public sector of industry in India, over a period in which it has been expanding ever more rapidly.

In his 1963 preface, reproduced in this edition, Shri Khera describes his main purpose as 'to examine the management, particularly the higher management, of government undertakings in India'; however, this description by no means prepares the reader for the extremely broad canvas on which he has drawn his study. He has for example, as part of the background, sketched in the world history and justification, as he sees it, of government intervention in economic life since the Industrial Revolution in Britain, and traced such intervention in India back to the time of the Chola Kings in the 11th and 12th centuries. The subject of parliamentary control he takes back to the rise of Parliament in the United Kingdom from the days of the 'Divine Right of Kings'. Treating the background of his rather specialised subject as broadly as this has necessarily led, even in a book of something over 400 pages, to his having to cover many important matters rather superficially, and to his limiting himself to mere assertions even where the merits of the matter, if it is to be dealt with at all, clearly require some depth of argumentation. This is particularly noticeable where controversial subjects are concerned. For instance he ascribes the economic disadvantages of independent India rather simply to the years of subjection to British rule and the dominance of British commercial interests; there is of course a serious argument to be unfolded here and a balance to be struck, but he does not attempt it.

Similarly over development assistance from other countries; he acknowledges the great contribution this has made, but is nevertheless highly critical of the Western donor governments, talking of 'so-called aid' and setting out as it were a charge sheet of their iniquities, from an account of the abortive negotiations with the United States over the projected steelworks at Bokara to the cutting off of Western arms supplies and spares at the time of the 1965 war with Pakistan – an odd intrusion this in a book about higher industrial management. And he includes a remarkably intemperate attack on 'appropriate technology' as an example of the developed countries wishing the second best on the developing world. On all these matters the views of a very senior civil servant such as Shri Khera has been – with a distinguished career in the Indian Civil

Service both before and after independence – are of special value, particularly to those having to do with India over development assistance. But it is a pity to have them expressed, as here, with so little of the supporting argument needed to provide a balanced view and with a consequent lack of persuasiveness.

On its main subject the book presents an extremely thorough historical and analytical study of the origin and growth of the public sector. It provides as it were an analytical study for the scholar combined with a prescriptive manual for the practitioner in the management of state industrial enterprises in India. Perhaps naturally, it is the latter which contains the most interest for the general reader, distilling as it does the fruits of his extensive personal experience. Throughout he presents himself as a convinced supporter of the objective of the Congress Government to create an egalitarian socialist society – more than once quoting with disfavour an unnamed colleague entrusted with the management of a state enterprise who was personally wholly out of sympathy with those objectives.

The historical section includes an interesting passage about the restraints on Indian development coming from the still strongly entrenched system of caste and class: the slow recognition by India's decision-takers of the need to bow to democratic pressures: the strains and stresses between the Centre and the States: and the effect of rivalries between right and left within the Congress in distorting the economic planning process. Then, after a generalised dissertation on the structure of management he categorises the types of organisation adopted for India's public enterprises over the years, describes and itemises the composition of their boards of management, concludes that the company form has proved the most workable, and describes a number of such companies in present operation. He next deals with management methods and problems, here giving an account of many severely practical matters in which his personal experience shines through with particular conviction and interest – how Government directives should and should not be given: where authority within a Government company rests or should rest: what delegation properly implies: the importance of equipment maintenance schedules: the questions to be considered when planning or setting up a project: difficulties in managing the relationship between the Centre and the host State: how to deal with foreign collaborators and with the Central Ministry in Delhi etc, etc. He then goes into much theoretical and practical detail on personnel management – the theoretical passages sometimes sounding rather oddly, as when he contrasts India's commitment to a free society with the situation in both Russia and the West (the USA because it had conscription is said to be *dirigiste* like the USSR, with Britain in a position similar to the USA). He regrets the lack of progress in India towards the Congress Government's ideal of worker participation in management, which he claims to believe would bring 'impressive if not dramatic' improvement in efficiency. The final chapters are essays on financial management, audit and control – which *inter alia* describe the inevitable battles between the management of an enterprise and the controlling Ministry in Delhi, and between both and the Ministry of Finance: on pricing, including a discussion on whether a state enterprise should make a profit: on the use of

science and technology: on the measuring of a management's performance: on delegation and accountability: and finally on the theory and practice of parliamentary control.

To sum up, this is a work which, perhaps because of its origin in a series of lectures, is somewhat overlarge in scope, importing a good deal of background history and theory, often rather inadequately and controversially expressed, which to this reviewer at least would better have been avoided in favour of a clearer focus on the main subject. On that subject, of the higher management of India's public sector enterprises, there is, amid a good deal of generalised argument and theoretical analysis, and sometimes over-detailed historical survey and classification, much of real interest and value for those who study or aim to operate in this important field.

R. H. B.

Local Ombudsmen. The Commission for Local Administration: a Preliminary Appraisal, NORMAN LEWIS and BERNARD GATESHILL; *Royal Institute of Public Administration,* 1978; pp 68; £2.20 paperback.

It is unfortunate that, at the time that the winds of change were blowing most former British colonies to independence, many serious shortcomings of the British system of government were still little recognised. Since that time more and more people have become worried by such phenomena as the increasingly unrepresentative nature of the Westminster parliament, and the blandly undemocratic paternalism of the Whitehall bureaucracy.

As a measure to mitigate some of these ills, the device of the 'ombudsman' has recently been imported into the United Kingdom from the Nordic countries. This innovation has been too recent, however, for the concept to have been incorporated in the politics of most of the former British dependencies which modelled their institutions on those of their former rulers. Nevertheless, the problems that now beset Britain are likely to be reflected in those other nations. Moreover, as the Dar-es-Salaam Seminar on Human Rights pointed out in 1976, the need for Ombudsman-type systems is particularly needed in those countries which lack adequate democratic checks on the power of their governments. So the successes and failures of this British experiment deserve close study by all of them, including those – e.g. Tanzania, Gambia, Fiji and several Indian States – which have already introduced the device for themselves.

Britain's first Ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, was appointed more than ten years ago. But the United Kingdom is a populous country, and so a single Ombudsman (like Denmark's or New Zealand's) could not be an adequate 'citizen's defender' on his own. So the Parliamentary Commissioner has been supplemented by the Northern Ireland Complaints Commissioner (1969), the Health Service Commissioner (1973) and several Local Commissioners for Administration (1974). It is with a review of the

effectiveness of the last of these that this RIPA study is concerned. Briefly, and on the whole clearly, the authors seek to outline the scope of the Local Commissioners' activities, to review their methods of working, and finally to assess the effectiveness of their contribution to the maintenance of a high standard of public administration in England (reference to the parallel institutions in Wales and Scotland are only incidental).

Like the Widdicombe Committee reporting on 'Our Fettered Ombudsman' (Justice, 1977), Mr Lewis and Mr Gateshill find that, although the institution has worked well, it has had to do so within a very narrow frame of reference, significantly restricted in scope and effectiveness compared to similar institutions abroad. Moreover, the Local Commissioners have tended to be less bold and forceful than their Northern Irish counterparts or than the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration himself: Lewis and Gateshill attribute this timorousness to the fact that the Representative Body for England – the committee appointed by the English local authority associations to oversee the work of the 'local ombudsmen' – has tended to perform a restrictive rather than a supporting role, in contrast to the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner, which has been responsible for emboldening him and causing him to extend his jurisdictional concepts.

The most serious restrictions on the work of the local ombudsmen in England appear to be the unsatisfactory channels of access to them; and the limitation of their jurisdiction to situations where members of the public can claim to have suffered 'injustice in consequence of maladministration'. The authors feel that the local ombudsman is too new an institution to allow them to be dogmatic about this latter problem, but they evidently sympathise with the Widdicombe Committee's belief that the ombudsmen in Britain have at present much too limited a scope of jurisdiction: contrast, for example, the Nova Scotia legislation, which permits the Ombudsman to investigate whenever a public authority or official has acted '*unreasonably, unjustly, oppressively or in a discriminatory manner*'.

The authors are less restrained in their approach to the former problem, which arises from the fact that the legislation establishing the local ombudsmen followed the narrow precedent set for the operation of the Parliamentary Commissioner, insisting that complaints should normally be forwarded in the first instance to a member of the authority complained against (contrast, again, Nova Scotia, where the Ombudsman may initiate investigations '*on the written complaint of or on behalf of the person aggrieved or on his own motion*'). Lewis and Gateshill find that this 'member-filter requirement' is a serious obstacle to the registering of complaints, and it is easy to see why this must be so. Only a few Members of Parliament are part of the central government Executive; but *every* local councillor is constitutionally a member of the very authority which has allegedly caused the injustice through maladministration. Since even now the majority of complaints are not accepted for investigation by the local ombudsmen for one reason or another, it must inevitably be inhibiting for a citizen to 'stick his neck out' by complaining to a member of his local council about that

council's own conduct. Lewis and Gateshill are emphatic that there is more than enough evidence for change, since there is no reason to suppose that the abolition of the 'member-filter' would result in the Local Commissioners being swamped with frivolous complaints.

One or two infelicitous abuses of English vocabulary and an often turgid style (e.g. 'Empirical research on the practice of local authorities at large would no doubt prove extremely informative but suffice it to say at this juncture that those which have striven officiously to take cognisance of the Commission's procedures by reformulating their own grievance mechanisms have rarely found themselves on the receiving end of the Commission's strictures' – p. 37) are insufficient to diminish the worth of this shrewd study, which deserves a wide audience, since they conclude that the Local Commissioners have made a sound and useful start and moreover by their very existence have caused a number of local authorities to review and reform their procedures – thereby confirming, perhaps, K. C. Wheare's remark that the Ombudsman system 'is more likely to make good government better than bad government good'.

HUBERT ALLEN

Local Government in Bougainville, JOHN CONNEL (Ed); *Bougainville Special Publications, Christchurch, New Zealand,* 1977; appendix; bibliography; pp 179.

This is an unassuming but important book; important because it is a study of local government in a developing country on the eve of independence; because the region that is the authors' concern was, at the time that the research for the case was being conducted, learning to live with the impact of a large copper mine; and because most of the authors are able to use their own perceptions as Bougainvilleans to describe and analyse their culture in transition.

Local government councils were first introduced in Papua New Guinea shortly after the Second World War but it was not until the 1960s that a network of councils was established on Bougainville. The councils, in theory intended to be part of a plan for democratic local self-government were, in practice, seen as agencies for carrying out the directives of an often insensitive central government and were subjected to the control of expatriate patrol officers. The councils lacked the authority of the headmen of earlier, more paternalistic, days and the legitimacy of traditional leaders; in most cases the councils were unable to meet the social and economic aspirations of the people many of whom witheld their taxes from councils that had neither the will nor the means to collect them. The resulting vacuum, together with a strong cultist tradition, discontent caused by the perceived deprivations of colonial rule and, from the late 1960s, the implications of mining developments all encouraged the growth of alternative organisations and procedures for meeting the aspirations of Bougainvilleans and settling disputes within their society. The present study looks at the councils in 1974; in September 1975 the Bougainville Provincial Government showed

its discontent with central government policies and in particular with the distribution of mining profits, and declared its secession from the newly independent nation of Papua New Guinea. The months before and beyond secession saw increasing attempts to establish agencies for local government and dispute settlement that were in tune with Bougainvillean traditions and expectations rather than with the overall design of a centralised government.

In the first two chapters of the book Charles Rowley and James Griffin sketch the background of local government development and of Bougainvillean political mobilisation within the context of the broader framework of Papua New Guinea as a whole. There follow a series of studies of selected wards and councils by Thomas Anis, John Dove, Jerry Kavop, Ignatius Namake and Warren A. Paia (all Bougainvillean graduates from the University of Papua New Guinea except for Paia who is from the neighbouring Solomon Islands). The emphasis is on perceptions, expectations and complaints rather than a comprehensive analysis of functions and performance; the net result is a picture of widespread discontent, of expectations unmatched by performance, and a local government structure that failed to recognise traditional cultural priorities. In a final chapter the editor, James Connell, draws broad conclusions and gives a brief account of developments from 1974 to 1977.

Much of *Local Government Councils in Bougainville* is an impressionistic survey rather than a detailed analysis but herein lies its value because it captures attitudes towards an important aspect of Bougainville's development during some of the most traumatic years of its history.

BARRIE MACDONALD

Evelyn Baring: The Last Proconsul, CHARLES DOUGLAS-HOME; *Collins, London,* 1978; bibliography; index; pp 344; £7.50.

Except for Margery Perham's studies of Lugard, the colonial interlude has not been well served by books about the great administrators or, for that matter, by their own published diaries and memoirs. Pope Hennessey's book of 1964, 'Verandah' is a highly readable account of a Governor grandfather around whose curious combination of ambition, misfortune and rancour, Trollope built the figure of Phineas Finn and is also illuminating on an obscure earlier colonial period. But most studies of administrators tend to be sadly pedestrian. Charles Douglas-Home's book about Evelyn Baring is, however, not only excellent writing, as one might expect from an author of his breadth and quality but also the more worthy to be read because of the events it covers and the character of the man himself.

Proconsular, Baring certainly was. The son of Lord Cromer, himself a Proconsul of the first water, with every desirable connexion of blood and friendship in the corridors of power, Baring had enviable personal qualities. High intelligence (a first at Oxford), broad and liberal interests, the support and enjoyment of a happy family life, and insight, in a different set of postings could have resulted in

great proconsular achievements. Perhaps he was too late on the imperial scene for his qualities to have full play and it was those very qualities which made him the natural choice for offices in countries among scenes of stress and intractable problems with no scope for the proconsular role. Probably he himself looked on his early Deputy Collector days in the Indian Civil Service and later work as Chairman of the Colonial Development Corporation as those most congenial to his disposition and ability. The author quotes Lyttelton when Secretary of State for the Colonies in the fifties as saying that 'Baring was too intelligent for the job' – this at a time when the job was to be Governor of Kenya – and that Baring always 'saw too many possibilities'.

Mr Douglas-Home's book is more a biography than a political study or essay in recent colonial history but the material illuminates the events. The author has very evidently had privileged access to certain sources of material from which he quotes, much of it personal correspondence of the family and others but one would judge that there is much in public records which was not drawn on and more which is still inaccessible. To some extent the book suffers from its sources – a man's letters to his family are not often the stuff of history – and the author draws perhaps too much on some Young and Erskine papers. (Col Young was for a short while Commissioner of Police in Kenya with ideas of some controversy in a colonial setting, General Erskine was Commander in Chief at the peak of the Emergency with terms of reference which were described as a prescription for disaster but which in the event with his good sense and Baring's diplomacy certainly never became so.)

Readers of this Journal will not therefore find much in this book about guiding philosophies or creeds on the part of Baring as to the discharge of the function of administration or the right lines of constitutional change. Baring was no writer of despatches for the benefit of later generations or the bubble reputation. And it is a pity he did not since in his time he was right at the centre of some of the most insoluble and important issues in East and Southern Africa – controversies which no simple political clout could have dissolved nor cool intelligence clarified. He was, for example, High Commissioner when South Africa aimed to incorporate the southern African Protectorates, Governor in Rhodesia during much of the run up to the Central African Federation and Governor of Kenya during Mau Mau and the now seemingly distant and unreal period when the political aspirations of four racial groups were being juggled into fancy franchises and entrenched rights and when the panoply of responsible ministerial government was being assumed without party rule or stable legislative majorities. His contribution was always great integrity and a mind somewhat better than most of those around him (not always necessarily a prescription for political success). Probably the practical achievements in which he took most pride and satisfaction in the execution would be schemes of agrarian development in the Protectorates and the agricultural progress and land settlement and reform programmes during his time in Kenya. The chapters in this book on his years in Southern Africa are the material of history. The Kenya period may be too near.

Apart from junior days in India, his life in Southern Africa and Rhodesia called for diplomatic and political rather than administrative abilities but the fairly

detailed descriptions of the operations of the Kenya administration during the period of the Mau Mau emergency should interest the readers of this Journal. Administration in Kenya was rarely free from bending to political events (if it ever should be) but the administration there probably played less part in such events than in most former African colonies. Indeed on his arrival Baring found the service in some disarray from a variety of causes – the nature of the Mau Mau movement, the peeling off of powers and influence to local government bodies of more sophisticated and elaborate authority than experience showed to be workable, incipient ministerial experiments and that unhappily flaccid label much used in Kenya in progress to self-rule, the 'Unofficial Committee or Board', usually balancing races, farmers, commerce and political figures. perhaps precisely because Kenya had an Emergency, there was a revival of the classical view of the purposes and operations of an administrative service and perhaps precisely becuse Kenya had an Emergency, there was a revival of the powers of the administrative service under Baring which remained after he left. He never met President Kenyatta until well after independence and it may be an accident or quirk of history that of all the independent states in Africa, the traditional and a fairly rigorous chain of command and structure of authority of a colonial type administration still appears to hold the field in Kenya.

T. C. COLCHESTER

Agrarian Reform and Peasant Organisation on the Ecuadorian Coast, M. R. REDCLIFT; *Athlone Press, London,* 1978; index; pp 186; £8.00.

In recent years, Ecuador has attracted an increasing amount of UK-based research on a variety of topics. Michael Redclift has made a useful contribution to our understanding of the process of agrarian change in the country with this monograph on land reform and peasant organisation in a rice growing district of the coastal region (the Guayas basin).

After describing the main features of agrarian structure in Ecuador as a whole and outlining the early attempts at land reform in the 1960s following the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, he identifies two processes of change which were of particular significance for the evolution of coastal society during the twentieth century. The first was the slump in cocoa production after the First World War which precipitated the break up of large estates into smaller holdings and led to the growth of rice production. This new cash crop provided the basis for a system of tenancy (*precarismo*) which was finally abolished in December, 1970. The second major process of change on the coast was the colonisation of a new internal frontier after 1945 settled by banana farmers, most of whom were of urban middle class extraction.

Dr Redclift's main purpose is to explain how the system of *precarismo* worked and why it was abolished, and how between 1970 and 1975 the Ecuadorean government implemented an agrarian reform programme in the region which has redefined the economic and political relationships between the State and

agricultural producers. He argues that it was more profitable for landlords to lease out land than to work it directly through the use of wage labour. However, after two bad drought years in the late 1960s which provoked much social unrest owing to food shortages, landlords showed themselves increasingly unwilling to invest in agriculture because of a fear of land reform. Faced with such a critical situation and under pressure from the United States Agency for International Development, the Ecuadorean government abolished the system of *precarismo,* promoted the creation of cooperatives and in 1973 passed an Agrarian Reform Law. However, this legislation differed little from that passed ten years previously and had only a minor impact on redistributing property in land. In addition, becaue rents were low in the rice zone during the 1960s, the agrarian reform did not lead to a major redistribution of income either. Dr Redclift suggests that the most important consequences of the reform have been increased State control over agricultural production following the extremely rapid rise in official credit to rice cooperatives made possible through the increase in government revenues from oil since 1972, and greater public sector intervention in rice marketing.

Those readers unfamiliar with Ecuadorian society with its penchant for bewildering acronyms such as FENACOOPARR may find the empirical material very dense in parts, while the author might have allowed more space for the definition of key terms such as cooperative, the meaning of which is by no means clear in all contexts. Nevertheless, this volume is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Ecuador, which hitherto has been one of the least studied countries in South America.

CHRIS SCOTT

Book Notes

Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa

MAI PALMBERG (Ed) *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala,* 1978

pp 243; Skr 45

This volume contains 14 Chapters (including an introduction), a selection of the papers presented at a Seminar held in Helsinki in 1976.

Mai Palmberg refers to Joe Slovo's distinguishing between two schools of thought: the first: 'pre school of false decolonisation' and the second where the state is regarded as the regulator and not the instrument of a class struggle, but it is Palmberg himself whose lively and perspective writing provides the most appeal, as when he gently chides those who need to cite Egypt as demonstrating a socialist-oriented development in Africa, which most would now describe as a capitalist country; he chides those who accept rhetoric for reality (and how many there are throughout Africa). The editor also provides the first chapters on 'the political role of the workers in Tanzania and Zambia'. It is an interesting and keenly argued stimulating diversion. But the editor is himself guilty of mistaking his own rhetoric for reality. The reality of Tanzania is the land of peasant cultivators, some prosperous from coffee, cotton, tobacco, and others struggling at subsistence farming. Tanzanians never met the full labour force of capitalist plantations: imported labour from Mozambique, Nyasaland, Kenya, the Congo filled many shortfalls. The description of early trade unions is a travesty of the truth: he is clearly unaware of the fact that for many years more labour migrated into (then) Tanganyika *from* the south, than emigrated south from Tanganyika *to* the south. There is reference to the Williamson Diamond fields – these are near Shinyanga and never belonged to de Beers as stated here.

Coffee was by no means confined to Kilimanjaro. Bukoba produced more and Rungwe a fair quantity.

In conclusion Palmberg points out correctly that both in Tanzania and in Zambia 'labour organisations have been integrated into the State machinery, and are generally used to raise productivity, restrain wage demands, and prevent strike action'. It would have been fair had he added that in a very poor country where salaried workers tend to form an élite minority (the fairly small number of plantation labourers are an exception) this policy has an egalitarian purpose and is arguably at least in the national interest.

The Politics of Bureaucracy

B. GUY PETERS; *Longman, New York and London*

Index; pp 246; £4.95

The author looks at Public Administration as 'an integral part of the political system' and stresses the ever-increasing involvement of Government in the lives of its citizens through the bureaucracy it creates and so often expands.

This is an interesting and stimulating book which should appeal to the politically-minded and to those in government service whether appropriately a-political or not. It is not altogether clear whether or not Guy Peters has given sufficient focus to the changeable facts of administration which are not determined by the 'system' *per se,* or by the procedural book, or by the statute book, but by the personalities of political leaders and civil servants at all levels and by their application to their tasks and their readiness to implement policy. In many lands a plethore of laws on the statute book *could* but are not implemented for a variety of reasons, with neither politician nor bureaucrat reluctant to take action – perhaps unpopular action.

Evaluation Research Methods: a basic guide

LEONARD RUTMAN (Ed) *Sage Publications*

Index; pp 238; £9.25 cloth; £4.50 paper

The theme of this book is a very important one. The diverse skills of a dozen North

American contributors do not, unfortunately, include the writing of good English, although the standards vary from author to author, some being very much better than others.

We are told that the book focuses on whether a programme 'meets the preconditions for an effectiveness evaluation': this surely is putting matters the wrong way round – it is up to evaluation researchers to evolve methods which will be reasonably effective, not on project planners to evolve their programmes so as to make life easy for the future evaluators!

The book, as a whole is concerned with theory and its practicality is not easy to assess. Any book in which sloppy scholarship allows the use of such terrible jargon as 'landlordization' is somewhat suspect and certainly this volume is heavy going for any but professional researchers concerned with programme evaluation work. Sub-titled 'a basic guide' – it is not clearly enough written for such a claim.

Guide Lines to writing Official Reports

IAN MAYO-SMITH *Kumarian Press, Connecticut, USA*

pp 34; $1.65

Ian Mayo-Smith has had very considerable experience in Public Administration training in Africa, so even such short guidelines as this volume provides, fully deserve the attention not only of those concerned with training the new administrative cadres in anglophone Africa, but also in Asia and the Caribbean where, like everywhere else, report writing is so often a major civil service duty and as elsewhere also, where there is plenty of room for improvement.

All that needs to be said here is that briefly, succinctly and clearly an inavluable guide – certainly a very useful check list, has been made available to those who draft reports – a guide which it is suggested those who are not well versed in this particular art, should keep readily to hand.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1978-1979

JOHN PAXTON (Ed) *The Macmillan Press Ltd*

Maps; tables; index; pp 1696; £9.95

This admirable annual now appears in a new and greatly improved format. The countries of the world appear in strict alphabetical sequence from Afghanistan to Zambia. The maps – this year: world desertification, the Panama Canal Zone and Belize are chosen – are exceptionally well reproduced.

For those concerned with international affairs in government, commercial or academic bodies this new volume should certainly find a place on the shelf reserved for valuable reference books. For its wealth of content the price remains remarkably low.

Leadership in America; Consensus, Corruption and Charisma

PETER DENNIS BATHORY (Ed) *Longman, London* 1978

Index; pp 200; £5.50 (UK only)

Following the editor's opening 65 pages, there follow eight contributions, the majority from teachers of political science with Rutgers University and/or Boston connections; the editor and four of these contributors were contemporaries at Oberlin College during the sixties. The broad canvas with some historical background (Madison and de Tocqueville) is provided by Peter Bathory.

The supporting essays are mostly short but full nonetheless of interesting arguments and character sketches.

John Lindsay: the world leader who rejected the politics of consensus.

John Kennedy: his boldness and grandeur did not provide the excellence which the popular versions have usually inferred.

James Cusley: demogogic boss maybe, but an Urban political leader who really helped the working poor from whom he received solid backing.

Cesar Chavez: helped by religious conviction to organise successfully the hitherto unorganisable Farm Workers.

Martin Luther King: he, who could 'sound like people felt'.

George Meaney: responsible for civic education of many union members, leading towards their support for Adlai Stevenson's balanced, liberal approach to politics.

Lyndon Johnson: a political atlas.

This well written volume, commendably free of jargon, deserves a wide readership.

United States Penetration of Brazil

JAN KNIPPERS BLACK; *Manchester University Press*

Appendices; bibliography; index; pp 313

The widow of John D. Black to whom she dedicates this book presents a liberal and highly critical approach to United States policies towards and 'Penetration' of Brazil – in particular during the period

since the military coup of 1964 set aside the existing constitutional government. She writes emotively and with anger if not with despair at the recent denationalisation policies in Brazil which she reckons the USA condones by way of military and other mainly economic assistance. She concludes that the hope for the underdeveloped world may lie in the transformation of the *developed* world and suggests that refugees from oppression in Brazil now in the United States may speed the process of 'conscientizacao'. The potential of Brazil is surely such that no penetration from outside will be able to withstand for long the emergent dynamics of indigenous development.

The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU

ZDENEK CERVENKA *Julien Friedman*

Map and index; pp 251; £7.50

The author examines the history and structure of the OAU. His approach is serious yet naive. He seems very much occupied with the Afro/Arab relationship and appears to disapprove of the great Israel raid on Entebbe. Surely mistakenly he seems to regard OAU policy on Southern Africa as its real test of strength. Southern Africa-Rhodesia and above all South Africa, provide the easiest rallying-call of all for a display of strength and unity by OAU, for none can gainsay the evils of apartheid. NO! it is in inter-African State relationships that OAU's real test lies – the ability to bring peace to the Horn of Africa for example, when conflicting views among member states makes concerted action so difficult.

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